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ABSTRACT 
In Economic Neoliberalism Became Almost Irrelevant, G.W. Kolodko states:  
New development policies are emerging after 10 years of experience with the transition 
process. Both theoreticians and policymakers are revising earlier theories about the 
market-state relationship, scrutinizing privatization processes, tackling deregulation 
arrangements with a fresh attitude, and attempting to deal with the far-reaching 
consequences of globalization (Kolodko, 1999).  
This research examines resistance to privatization in Egypt. It researches the 
reasons behind such resistance and the tactics of resistance as well. It also examines the 
different modes of resistance that exist in Egypt. Finally, it attempts to find out the effects 
of such resistance on privatization in order to prove that that local resistance to 
privatization may, in some cases, alter the outcomes. 
Secondly, in an attempt to find out the implications of resistance on the 
privatization track in Egypt, the research draws a comparison between two cases of 
Egyptian local resistance. The first case represents a model for the failure of privatization 
due to resistance and the other case represents a model for the success of privatization in 
the absence of strong resistance. The research shows how different combinations of 
reasons of resistance, tactics of resistance, and modes of resistance affect the impact of 
the resistance and its success or failure. 
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CHAPTER I 
A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
This chapter examines the main theoretical issues concerning economic 
liberalization, privatization and resistance. It is divided to three parts. It starts with an 
introduction followed by the definition of liberalization, privatization, and the types of 
privatization. Then it links privatization to economic liberalization theoretically and 
reviews the literature that tackled the relationship between the two.  
The second part of the chapter presents the theoretical framework of the study. In 
order to explain resistance to privatization, I use Tironi’s theory of resistance, which 
traces all modes of resistance to the existence of different forms of exclusion and 
exploitation. I review some theories that explain resistance but fail to address all the 
reasons of resistance, which supports my choice of Tironi’s theory. This part of the 
chapter ends with explaining the importance of the study as well as the methodology 
utilized to implement it. 
The third part of the chapter explores the reasons behind resistance privatization 
specifically. The reasons behind resistance to privatization are sorted to reasons related to 
privatization as donor driven and reasons related to the nature of privatization. Finally, 
the chapter ends with the modes of resistance that exist and some examples of resistance 
that exist around the world.  
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Part 1:  Liberalization and Privatization 
 
Introduction 
The results of planning in the LDCs were disappointing. The majority of 
countries failed to achieve the planned objectives. Public sector investment 
projects frequently performed poorly. The import substitution industrialization 
strategy (ISI), which formed an integral part of the interventionist approach to 
development in the 1950s, 1960s, was associated with wide spread inefficiencies 
and resource misallocation
1
. 
 
After a log rule of the Keynesian mechanisms and statist economic policies that    
prevailed through the fortieth and fiftieth and continued for two more decades in the 
developing countries
2
, the liberal perspective of state and market came to rule.  
Reevaluating the role of the state was actually a product of the state failure to face   
many problems and its further creation of new problems. The vigorous augmentation of 
the roles and functions of the state, which varied from the expansion of administrative 
systems to the wide provision of public services and involved the emergence of the state 
as the ‘major employer and producer’3, increased the burden on the state and prevented it 
from meeting most of its responsibilities. In addition, the Import Substitution policy, 
which many states defended and went through, raised the level subsidies, the state 
expenditures, and the budget deficit. Moreover, it did not lead to significant substitution 
of imports or successful and sustainable state entry into manufacturing
4
. The ISI policies 
along with other problems aggravated the states’ economic situation, increased the 
                                                 
1
P. Cook and C. Kirkpatrick, Privatization in Less Developing Countries (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1988), 8. 
 
2
E.A Brett, in Privatization in Less Developing Countries, Cook P. and C, Kirkpatrick (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988), 47. 
 
3
T. Killick, and S. Commander, Privatization in Less Developing Countries, Cook P. and C, 
Kirkpatrick (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988), 93. 
 
4
Ibid.   
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countries’ debt and borrowing level and subsequently exposed the states to what was 
called ‘fiscal crisis of the state’5.  
The fiscal crisis of the state was coupled with problems in the state enterprises. 
The state enterprises suffered problems such as inefficiency, corruption, lack of 
accountability and irrational spending. By the middle of the 1970s, the need for state and 
economy adjustment was highly assured
6
. The adjustment required a wider and deeper 
role of the market and price mechanisms; in other words, it required economic 
liberalization
7
. 
With the fall of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union, impediments to 
the spread of liberalization were abolished. The fall of communism signifies the fall of a 
true challenger to liberalism. On the other hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union helped 
accelerating the process of liberalization around the world. Hence, liberalization became 
a deriving force in the contemporary world.   
As liberalization mounts and grows, privatization -as a main component of 
liberalization as well as an incentive for the spread of liberalization- mounts and grows. 
In order to show the link between liberalization and privatization, both terms shall be 
well defined in a way that clarify the possible connection between them.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
Brett, 47.  
 
6
Cook and Kirkpatrick, 5. 
 
7
Ibid, 9.  
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The Definition of Liberalization 
In its European connotation, the term ‘Liberal’ refers to the “commitment to 
individualism, free market, and private property”8. Liberalization, on the other hand, 
refers to the needed process to reach liberalism. On the Political level, liberalization 
refers to many things. It refers to the respect and pursuit of civil freedoms, such as 
freedom of expression, freedom of choice, and freedom of action. It is also connected to 
liberal democracy
9
. Thus, it calls for freedom to choose rulers through multiparty system 
and the freedom to change them through regular and free elections
10
. It also calls for 
transparency, accountability, etc… 
On the other hand and most important to this research is the definition of 
economic liberalization. On the economic level, in the twenty one century meaning, 
liberalization refers to the shift to market economy and the process of opening markets, 
shrinking the role of the state, deregulating goods, services, capital, and labor
11
. It 
increases transactions and reduces the cost of such transactions. 
 
The Definition of Privatization 
As defined in Kurland and Brohawn’s paper presented to the American Banker 
Conferences, privatization means restructuring economic institutions in order to create a 
"competitive free enterprise system" as well as encouraging the private sector to engage 
                                                 
8
Robert Gilpin, The political economy of international relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1987), 27.  
 
9
M.ohamed Algohary, Globalization and Islamic culture (Cairo: Dar Al Amin for publishing 
2002), 22.  
 
10
Ibid, 23.  
11
David Hulme, Michael Edwards, NGOs, States and Donors: An Overview and Key Issues (UK: 
Carfax Publishing Company, 1997), 5:7 and Algohary, 24. 
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in the fields that are currently administrated by the public sector
12
. However, the practice 
of privatization exceeds its classical meaning of involving the private sector into ‘the 
services that the government provides’ to ‘the services and the functions that the 
government is actually responsible of but many not be practically providing’13. Thus, it is 
no more involving in what the government actually administrates or provides but what 
falls under the government responsibility. 
Christopher Adam gives a similar but much specific definition to Privatization. 
He believes that Privatization is not an end but rather a process to reach efficiency. This 
happens through transfer of ownership as well as transfer of goods and services’ 
provision to the private sector. 
In the cases where privatization refers to the transfer of goods and services’ 
provision to the private sector, privatization is reflected in quadrants 2 and 4 (see Roth 
Matrix). At the two quadrants, the private sector is the main provider of the service. 
However, the public sector becomes the main player or owner when it performs 
contracting (quadrant 2) while the private sector becomes the main player or owner when 
it buys some State Owned Enterprises ‘SOEs’ (quadrant 4)14. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Kurland and Brohawn, “Beyond Privatization: An Egyptian Model”. American Banker 
Conferences on ESOPs (U.S: New York, 1993).  
 
13
 Privatization, Competition, and partnership, 
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/rpt/pvt/ch2.htm. 
 
14 Christopher Adam et al, Adjusting Privatization, Case Studies from Developing Countries 
(London: James Currey Ltd, 1992), 7.   
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The Provider 
Public                          Private 
 
                    Public 
The Player 
                    Private 
Figure 1. Roth Matrix  
Source: Roth in Christopher, A., 1992, 6 
 
Combining Kurland and Brohawn’s definition with Christopher’s definition of 
privatization, one can easily recognize the three areas of change that privatization may 
involve as identified by Cook and Kirkpatrick in their book Privatization in Less 
developed countries. The first area of change entails “liberalization or deregulation of 
entry into activities previously restricted to public sector enterprises”15. The second area 
of change refers to change in ownership. The last area of change is the area of goods and 
services’ provision. 
According to Kurland and Brohawn’s definition and Christopher’s definition, 
privatization can take ten forms. It can take the form of Contracting, Franchise, 
Vouchers, Subsidy, Service or "Load" Shedding, Asset Sale or Lease, Volunteers, Self-
help, Infrastructure Development, or Deregulation (see Table 1 for definitions). In all 
cases, privatization gives lead to private enterprises whether the domestic or the foreign 
ones. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
Cook and Kirkpatrick, 4.  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
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Table 1. Types of privatization 
1. Contracting. Government contracts with a private organization, for-profit or 
nonprofit, to provide a service or part of a service. 
2. Franchise. A private firm is given the exclusive right to provide a service within a 
certain geographical area. This is contracting with a twist. For example, governments 
often give franchises to cable television companies and bus companies, or to fast food 
chains to operate restaurants on turnpikes. 
3. Vouchers. Government pays for the service; however, individuals are given 
redeemable certificates to purchase the service on the open market. The certificates, or 
vouchers, subsidize the consumer of the service, but services are provided by the 
private sector. Food stamps, housing vouchers, and vouchers for child day care are 
some examples of widely used voucher programs. Voucher programs put the "power of 
the purse" in the hands of consumers, allowing them to decide who will get their 
business. 
4. Subsidy. The producer of a service is subsidized by the government contributing 
financially or in-kind to a private organization to reduce the costs to consumers. 
Hospitals, medical schools, and developers of low-income housing are subsidized 
because they produce goods and services considered beneficial to the public interest. 
 5. Service or "Load" Shedding. Government stops providing the service, 
relinquishing any responsibility for its provision, and lets the private sector assume the 
function. 
6. Asset Sale or Lease. Government sells or leases assets such as airports, gas utilities, 
or real estate to private firms, thus turning physical capital into financial capital. 
7. Volunteers. Volunteers provide all or part of a government service. 
8. Self-help. Community groups and neighborhood organizations take over a service or 
government asset such as a local park or community pool. The new providers of the 
service also directly benefit from the service. 
9. Infrastructure Development. The private sector builds, finances, and operates 
public infrastructure such as roads and airports, recovering costs through user charges. 
10. Deregulation. Government regulations are eliminated from a government 
monopolized service to allow private providers to compete. Deregulation of express 
mail statutes governing the Postal Service, for example, allowed Federal Express, 
United Parcel Service, and their competitors to begin delivering packages overnight. 
 
Source: Guide to Developing Public-Private Partnerships, J& E Associates, 1997 
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The Links between Privatization and Liberalization 
In theory, privatization and liberalism are very much connected. Forms of 
liberalism (since Adam Smith till now, classical, neo classical, etc…) though differ in 
their stress over the role of the state or state interventionism, they all believe in the 
essentiality of market competition and price mechanism
16
. Market competition and price 
mechanism, in turn, encourage lower costs of information, lower prices of products as 
well as higher quality of products
17
. Thus, they enhance efficiency in the enterprises, 
which is the main target behind privatization
18
. Thus, liberalism helps reaching the 
essence of privatization. 
In addition, the three areas of change that privatization involves, as described 
above by Cook and Kirkpatrick, show other connections between privatization and 
liberalization (economic liberalization specifically)
19
. They explain the similarity and 
connection between liberalization and privatization in regard to the role of the state and 
the market.  
The first area of change that reveals such similarity, as Cook and Kirkpatrick 
state, is “liberalization or deregulation of entry into activities previously restricted to 
public sector enterprises”20. Privatization as defined by Kurland and Brohawn involves 
engaging the private sector in the areas that fall under government responsibilities. 
                                                 
16
Gilpin, 27.  
17
Adam, 17.  
18
Ibid.   
19
 Economic liberalization in this context is related to the neoliberal perspective or form of 
liberalism, which stresses on minimal state intervention. This makes the connection between liberalization 
and privatization clearer. 
  
20
Cook and Kirkpatrick, 4.  
 9 
 
Christopher Adam specifies such engagement in terms of administration or transfer of 
ownership that allows the private sector to provide goods and services. However, 
logically, if any field or area is restricted to the public sector, the private sector will not 
be able to engage in it whether by ownership or administration. In addition, it will not be 
able to provide goods or services.  
Privatization requires two things in order to facilitate and encourage the 
engagement of the private enterprises in the areas restricted to the public sector. It 
requires reducing the role of the state in the economic and possibly the social sphere. This 
facilitates the engagement of the private enterprises into the areas that were previously 
restricted to the public sector, such as health and education. It also requires opening the 
market to capital, labor, etc…21, which encourages public enterprises to engage in 
different activities. In other words, it requires economic liberalization. 
The second area of change refers to the change in ownership. Privatization 
involves the transfer of ownership as one of the two possible ways to engage in the public 
sphere. In Roth Matrix, transfer of ownership represents quadrant 4 where the private 
sector is the main player (the owner) and the provider of the service. 
Taking part in ownership requires many things. It requires freedom of actions as 
well as freedom of finance and capital movements
22
, which facilitates trade and 
investment. This provides an encouraging environment for long investment. At last, 
expanding private ownership requires shifting the role of the state from controlling and 
owning economic transactions to only providing an environment favorable to free trade, 
                                                 
21
Ibid, 4.  
22
Paul J Welfens, “Privatization and Foreign Direct Investment in the East European 
Transformation: Theory, Options and Strategies”, in Privatization, Liberalization and Destruction, ed. 
Casaba, L (Great Britain: Athenaeum Press Ltd, Newcastle upon Tyne, 1994), 38.  
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free market, and free entry of capital, goods, and services. Hence, privatization needs 
economic liberalization since or market economy depends on autonomous enterprises that 
work without political pressure and with self-management
23
. 
The last area of change is the area of goods and services’ provision. Whether 
privatization promotes change in administration or change in ownership, the private 
enterprises start to have the responsibility of providing goods and services instead of the 
public sector.  In Roth matrix, this falls in quadrants 2 and 4 where the private sector is 
not necessarily the main player but is necessarily the provider of goods and services.  
In order to encourage privatization, the provision of goods and services by private 
enterprises should be promoted. This requires shifting the states’ economies from central 
planning to market economy. Market economies increase and improve competition. They 
work according to the supply and demand, which makes them work freely and without 
state intervention. Thus, privatization demands economic liberalization and competition. 
It is worth noting that both Privatization and economic liberalization target the 
market. Changes in the three areas -ownership, goods and services provision, and 
activities previously restricted to SOEs- create enough property to make the market work 
and prosper
24
, which is the same target of liberalization. Thus, their goals match together.  
Thus, in theory, privatization and economic liberalization are linked. The core 
concept of each of them is linked to the other (efficiency and competition). The three 
areas of change that privatization involves require opened markets, deregulated flows of 
capital and labor, and market economies. In addition, both privatization and economic 
liberalization refresh the market and reduce the role of the state. 
                                                 
23
Dabrowsky, 29.  
24
Hernado de Soto, The Economist, 1993.   
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A Literature Review 
The literature of privatization is divided to scholars who relate privatization to 
liberalization and others who do not. On the top of the scholars who argue that 
privatization and liberalization are not related is Paul Starr. Starr argues that one should 
distinguish between privatization and liberalization. He states that privatization seeks 
efficiency while liberalization seeks market competition, which are different. A state can 
increase competition in the public sector or between the public and the private through 
increasing finance or incentives and not necessarily through privatization
25
. In addition, 
competition leads to lower costs and better qualities, which spontaneously promotes 
efficiency without necessarily privatizing
26
.  
He continues to argue that even in history, privatization and liberalization did not 
go together. Some countries adopted liberalization and still did not privatize; on the 
contrary, they liberalized and nationalized at the same time. In early 1980s, the French 
socialists liberalized financial markets quite after nationalizing Banks
27
. On the other 
hand, some countries adopted privatization without following liberalization. For example, 
when Thatcher started the privatization wave in England, she was not following 
liberalization before it or attempting to
28
.  Thus, liberalization and privatization are not 
necessarily connected. 
                                                 
25
Paul Starr, “The meaning of Privatization”, in Privatization and the Welfare State. Alfred Kahn 
and Sheila Kamerman [book on-line] (Princeton University Press, 1988). 
 
26
Guide to Developing Public-Private Partnerships J& E Associates, 1997  
27
Ibid.  
28
Starr, 1988.  
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On the other hand, some scholars argue that liberalization and privatization are 
related and connected. Betty Reid Mandell and William S. Peirce argue that privatization 
is derived by ideology. Hence, an ideology that promotes market economy and opens 
borders to capital, labor, goods and services will logically encourage privatization while a 
socialist ideology will most likely encourage nationalization
29
. In that sense, 
liberalization encourages and derives privatization. 
In addition, while Starr uses the history to prove that privatization and 
liberalization are not related, other scholars use the present time events to prove they are 
connected. Cook and Kirkpatrick state, “privatization has emerged as one element in a 
more general shift in the dominant development paradigm”30, the liberal paradigm. Tony 
Killick and Simon Commander state “The current emphasis on privatization in the 
modification of economic policy priorities can be seen as a part of a more general 
rehabilitation of the use of prices and markets as mechanisms”31; unquestionably, the 
prices and markets as mechanisms refer to economic liberalization. 
In addition, Christopher Adam, Lukin A.V, Geoffrey Garrett, Bruce Kogut and 
others argue that privatization and liberalization are connected because privatization 
comes as inseparable part of the conditionality and the adjustment packages that promote 
liberalization. They argue that donor countries and international financial institutions 
(IFIs) spread privatization while trying to push economic liberalization around the world.  
                                                 
29
 Starr (1988); and William Peirce, Privatization, Nationalization and aspects of transition 
[database on-line] (2000, accessed at 15 September 2004), from www.uni-
erfurt.de/finanzwissenschaft/lv/Handbook.  
 
30
Cook and Kirkpatrick, 7.  
31
T. Killick, S. Commander, in Cook and Kirkpatrick, 91.  
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Donor countries and major international financial institutions, like the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) spread privatization in developing 
countries. Donor agencies started to relate their donations to the commitment of the 
recipient countries to certain conditions. Such conditions ought to derive “conscious 
change in the fundamental nature of economic relationships within society as well as 
change to the structure of the economy in order to meet the long-term needs of efficient 
utilization of factors of production to ensure sustained growth”32. They are neoliberal 
conditions or neoliberal package that actually contain privatization as an inseparable 
item
33
. Nancy Brune, Geoffrey Garrett, and Bruce Kogut argue that the conditionality of 
the IMF and the World Bank forced recipient governments to privatize more SOEs
34
. In 
that sense, they spread and consolidated privatization while trying to promote 
liberalization
35
. 
Some reasons encouraged the IMF and the World Bank to shift their policy to 
program aid or policy lending which relates the agency’s finance to the applicability of 
certain policies or programs. The most important one is related to the autonomy of the 
World Bank and the IMF. Their autonomy depends on their finance and their 
administration policy
36
. The two conditions reflect the power of the nations. Since the 
largest financial contributor and the only country with the right to veto on formal 
                                                 
32
Bob Milward, “What is Structural Adjustment?” in Structural Adjustment: Theory, Practice, and 
Impact, Mohan, Giles et al (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 25.  
 
33
Adam et al, 3.   
34
Nancy Brune, Geoffrey Garrett, and Bruce Kogut, The International Monetary Fund and the Global 
Spread of privatization (The Reginald H. Jones Center: Wharton School, 2003).  
 
35
Hulme, 5:7.  
36
Samir Amin, Capitalism in the Age of Globalization (London: Zed Books, 1999), 33.  
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amendments in the World Bank is the United Sates, then the bank is not actually 
autonomous when it comes to the U.S or its interests
37
. Since the USA adopts 
privatization and considers it an incentive to more liberalization, it is logical to find it in 
most, if not all, of the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and the IMF
38
. 
 
Part 2: Theoretical Framework, Methodology, and Limitations 
The trend to liberalize and privatize is increasingly spreading around the world. 
However, the two trends are not mounting unquestionably. Dissatisfaction with the two 
trends is increasing as well. Resistance is growing in many countries. 
Resistance in the research refers to the responses made to counteract privatization. 
The optimum goal of such resistance is to destroy privatization and introduce alternatives 
or at least reform privatization. However, the grassroots’ resistance, specifically, refers to 
the responses to privatization by the ordinary people, who do not occupy high positions 
or seize concrete power. Grassroots’ resistance emerges in order to “respond” in a way 
that can bring out reform or change in the future.  
 
 
 
                                                 
37
Kapur, 2002. 
38
 The major financial contributors in the World Bank use their finance to push forward their 
ideology and pursue their interests. Robert Wade refers to the Japanese model as a challenge to the 
American one. Japan, the second fund provider to the World Bank, propagandizes for the Japanese called 
“miracle” through the publications of the MITI (the Asian Development Plan) and the publications of the 
World Bank (the East Asian miracle). Japan encourages its recipient countries to use more state 
interventionist policies, direct and subsidized credit, and operate strategies of guided markets, which is very 
different to the American strategy (see Wade, 1994). Aid and finance are tools in the hand of the powerful 
most paying states. However, it is not a Zero-sum game; rather, it is a transaction and a mutual cooperation 
process at which both, the recipient and the donor, benefits (see Heba Handoussa’s Fifteen years of US aid 
to Egypt with reference to the American Egyptian aid as an example).  
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The Theoretical Framework 
The reasons behind resistance provide clue to the kind of resistance and its 
strength. Many theories attempted to explore the reasons behind resistance. One of the 
most important theories is Tironi’s theory of resistance. According to Tironi’s theory in 
Franc Shuurman’s book, Beyond the Impasse, social movements, grassroots movements, 
and other types of resistance emerge in order to respond to the exploitive or exclusive 
policies that affect them negatively
39
.  
Tironi clarifies his point of view through a very flexible matrix. The matrix does 
not limit resistance to specific reasons. Rather, it bases the existence of resistance on the 
presence of exploitation and exclusion, which takes different forms and various degrees. 
For example, if the people feel exploited or excluded on all fronts (economically, 
politically, and socially), they will break with the system and resort to revolutionary acts, 
see ad 3, 4. On the other hand, they can be reformist and actively participate in the system 
in order to bring in reform, see ad 1, 2
40
. To Tironi, resistance emerges in order to 
challenge or respond to exploitive and exclusive policies. 
exploitation 
                      
                                                         1                         3                
                             participation                                               break 
                                                       
                                                          2                        4 
exclusion 
 
Figure 2. Tironi’s matrix  
Source: Franc Schuurman, 1999, p.199 
                                                 
39
  Franc Shuurman, Beyond the Impasse (U.K: Biddles Lid, Guildford and King’s Lynn, 1996), 
199.  
 
40
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 16 
 
The terms exclusion and exploitation can not be objectively defined. Although the 
word exploitation, for example, attained currency in the nineteenth century and was 
severally used by Marxists and social reformers to explain the relations between the 
capitalists and the proletariat
41
, it is not necessarily limited to that nineteenth century 
meaning per se or even the twentieth century definition (which explains resistance in 
term of labor-management relations
42). ‘Exploitation’ can be better thought of in terms of 
the alternatives that will be available
43
. For example, dismissing workers in countries that 
bear high rates of unemployment may leave no options in front of the workers but to stay 
at home or accept improper jobs, which is, thus, exploitation.  
On the other hand, the term exclusion has many meanings. It can refer to 
voluntary exclusion, which aims at reinforcing social cohesion or achieving one’s wish of 
being excluded
44. However, ‘exclusion’ as used in this research can be better thought of 
in terms of the “dissatisfaction or unease felt by individuals who are faced with situations 
in which they cannot achieve their objectives”45. In addition, ‘exclusion’ can be thought 
of with regard to ‘inclusion’ (e.g. if some people have access to goods and services, they 
are included while if they do not have access to them, then they are excluded)
46
. 
                                                 
41
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Tironi offers an explanation to resistance suitable to this research. His theory and 
matrix examine the ‘Reasons behind resistance to privatization’ comprehensively and 
properly more than other scholars or theoreticians. For example, Tironi’s matrix and 
theory of resistance provides a much more comprehensive justification to resistance than 
Adrian Smith and John Pickles. Smith and Pickles state that poverty and inequality lead 
to resistance, which for them refers to the survival strategies and the illegal or semi legal 
activities that rise to respond to the previous two factors
47
. They continue to say that such 
strategies or activities are “ways in which individuals with deferential powers are able to 
mobilize existing social, political, and economic resources to find a pathway through the 
maelstrom of transition”48.  
However, looking at the two concepts of “Poverty” and “Inequality”, one can find 
that they reflect a degree of exploitation and exclusion. Poverty exploits some people and 
excludes others from the economic and social life. The same can be applied to the 
concept of inequality; it gives an indication that some people are excluded and implies 
that others exploit them. Thus, Tironi’s explanation of resistance is clearer and much 
more comprehensive. It does not insist on one form of exploitation or exclusion; instead, 
it approves all forms of exploitation and exclusion as reasons for resistance. 
However, though Tironi’s theory offers a justification to the emergence of 
resistance (or the reasons behind resistance), one can not solely depend upon it to fully 
analyze resistance. This research utilizes a reformed model of Tironi’s theory that 
combines other aspects of resistance. Specifically, the research combines the reasons 
                                                 
47
Adrian Smith, John Pickles, Theorizing Transition: The Political Economy of Post-Communist 
Transformations (London: Routledge Curzon, 1999), 3. 
  
48
Ibid, 5.  
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behind resistance with the tactics of resistance (which refer to the techniques used in 
order to perform the resistance) as well as the modes of resistance (which are certain 
descriptions to the forms of resistance and are not necessarily related to the chosen tactics 
of resistance). 
There are different modes of resistance. One can differentiate between political 
vs. public mode of resistance, infrapolitics or implicit vs. visible and explicit mode of 
resistance, organized vs. unorganized mode of resistance, and global vs. local mode of 
resistance.  
James Scott (1990) spoke about the peasant’s weapons of resistance, which referred to 
the peasants’ mode of resistance as “infrapolitics” type of resistance49. This resistance 
occurs on daily basis in the normal life of the peasants when they negotiate their 
resources and their problems
50
. This mode of resistance reflects the possession of limited 
resources and moderate powers. On contrary to the infrapolitics mode of resistance, there 
is the visible, clear, or explicit mode of resistance that reflects much confidence and 
influence. Karl Polanyi spoke about modes of resistance with regard to the agents of 
resistance organizational structure. He suggested that if they have organizational 
structure, they can form movements
51. They can also form ‘submerged’ networks if they 
do not have an organizational structure
52
. Moreover, there is political mode of resistance, 
which reflects the resistance of decision makers and their lack of commitment (or lack of 
                                                 
49
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50
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52
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political will)
53
. On the contrary to this mode of resistance, there is the resistance of the 
ordinary people who do not possess formal power or authority. At last, there is the global 
mode of resistance and the local mode of resistance. They both identify different fields of 
action while might have the same goals or objectives. 
On the other hand, there are numerous tactics of resistance. The agents of 
resistance can use one or more tactic of resistance. They can choose from direct actions, 
media, and formal or legal channels. They can also choose to use violent means of 
actions versus non-violent ones. 
To conclude, the modes of resistance and the choice of resistance tactics depend 
on the agents of resistance levels of awareness, culture, and education. They also depend 
on the resources and powers that the agents of resistance enjoy and have access to
54
. In 
addition, they depend on the number of opportunities and privileges they feel they are 
losing, the formal channels they can reach, the power of the sector they work in, the 
number of the workers resisting, and their stress reactions.  
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Figure 3. The reformed model of Tironi’s theory of resistance 
 
Analysis of Resistance 
 
 
 
 
 
Reasons for resistance            tactics of resistance                  modes of resistance 
Tironi’s theory                    uncountable number of tactics                political vs. public                                                       
& matrix, based on:                  e.g. direct actions,                       organized vs. 
unorganized 
Exclusion                     media, or formal and legal channels           infrapolitics vs. explicit 
Exploitation                            They can also involve:                                   global vs. local 
                                           violent vs. nonviolent tactics  
                                        or invent new tactics of resistance  
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Methodology 
Christopher Adam (1992) states “the debate surrounding privatization in 
developing countries is based on limited empirical evidence”55. Since depending on the 
reformed model of Tironi’s theory of resistance will just derive another impractical study, 
the research studies two cases of resistance in particular. The first case of resistance is the 
case of the Delta for fertilisers and the second case of resistance is the case of Cemex. 
The first case represents a model for strong successful resistance while the second case 
represents a model for weak failing resistance. The two cases were chosen randomly to 
reflect the general types of resistance that exist in Egypt. Within the chosen cases, the 
reasons behind the workers’ resistance, the tactics of resistance as well as the modes of 
resistance are all shown and detected. Studying two different/contradicting cases of 
resistance will –to some extent- reveal the factors behind the success or failure of their 
resistance to privatization. 
Throughout the research and along with the theoretical line, a qualitative 
methodology that depends mainly on interviews and questionnaires is utilized. The 
interviews and the questionnaires are conducted with decision makers, problem solvers, 
labor union representatives, labor syndicate representatives, resistance activists as well as 
workers and employees. Annexes with information about the interviewees and the 
detailed texts of the interviews and the questionnaires are attached to the research 
In-depth interviews were conducted with the employees in the privatization unit 
in the Ministry of Investment. The purpose of these interviews was to help discovering 
the reasons of resistance, tactics of resistance, and modes of resistance that exist in Egypt 
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since they are the decision makers and the problem solvers who deal with the issue of 
privatization. The interviews also aimed at discovering their opinion as decision-makers 
and top-level administrators in the two case studies, Delta for fertilisers and Cemex. The 
interviews were conducted with the privatization assessment expert, a senior official in 
the privatization program until 1998, and other official in the privatization unit whose 
names were not mentioned upon their request (for security reasons). 
Other interviews were conducted with workers or the employees (including the 
labor union or labor syndicate representatives). The interviews were conducted in the 
form of face-to-face questionnaires. The first questionnaire was conducted with the 
employees in the Delta for fertilisers. The second questionnaire was conducted with the 
employees in Asiut cement (Cemex). A sample of about 12 employees (administrators, 
workers, managers, etc...) was used in each questionnaire.  
The questionnaires attempted to find out the reasons behind the workers’ 
resistance. They also attempted to find out the tactics of resistance the workers used in 
each case study. In addition, they helped detecting the modes of resistance that each case 
study represented. This will hopefully explain the relation between privatization and 
resistance in the two cases. 
In addition, other interviews were conducted with resistance activists. An 
interview was conducted with the anti-globalization movement activist in Egypt. The 
goal of this interview was to show whether the movement finds it viable to work on the 
local level or not. It showed the perspective of the anti-globalization movement in Egypt 
with regard to resistance to privatization. Other interviews were conducted with the labor 
union and labor syndicate representatives in the Delta for fertilisrs as well as Cemex. 
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These interviews attempted also to reveal the reasons behind resistance, the tactics of 
resistance and the modes of resistance. In the case of the Delta for fertilisers, specifically, 
the statements of the labor union and labor syndicate representatives were very important 
since they played a great role in organizing and directing the resistance. 
 
The Limitations of the Study 
Researching and detecting resistance to privatization in Egypt was not an easy 
subject neither in theory nor in field research. I actually met some difficulties during this 
study. Lack of sources (books and articles) that tackle the resistance to privatization 
specifically was one of such difficulties. I had to use my imagination to find out the 
theoretical and conceptual base for this resistance. Except for the Egyptian book 
Privatization in Egypt: The Debate in the people’s assembly, which is written by highly 
academic and professional individuals, very few sources spoke of resistance to 
privatization inside Egypt.  
However, I tried to compensate lack of written sources with some interviews with 
the high rank employees and decision makers who were responsible of planning and 
implementing the privatization program and were later responsible of solving its 
problems. Nevertheless, the issue was very sensitive. While doing my interviews and 
questionnaires, I was faced with fear and suspicion. I was even advised not to say the 
name of my research “Resistance to Privatization in Egypt” while doing my 
questionnaires with the workers (which I did not do of course). Instead, I attempted to 
solve this problem through building a line of confidence between me and the workers and 
 24 
 
advised them not to mention their names for security reason, which removed some of 
their caution.  
The last limitation of the study was actually the lake of time. Studying some 
factors -such as culture, awareness, education, acquisition of resources, .etc- might have 
helped understanding and analyzing resistance. If there is any future possibility to 
continue with this research, my primary concern will be detecting and studying such 
factors in Egypt. I actually recommend that other researchers shall start involving more in 
such factors in order to have a full and perfect picture of resistance to privatization in 
Egypt.  
 
The Importance of the Study 
This research attempts to reveal the ambiguity that encircles the progress of 
privatization in Egypt. In addition, the research will attempt to identify factors 
contributing to the failure and success of privatization. It will show how resistance to 
privatization can affect the course of privatization and even change it or reverse it with 
reference to Egypt in general and to an Egyptian case study in particular.  
This becomes possible through studying the effect of different combinations of (i) 
motives or reasons of resistance, (ii) the utilized tactics of resistance, and (iii) the possible 
modes of resistance. Thus, the research offers a fine study to the three factors and their 
effect through comparing two case studies that have different combinations of the three 
factors. Finally, the research will prove that resistance on the local level can be very 
effective and can through cumulative effect lead to reform or change in the path of 
privatization.  
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Part 3: Resistance to Privatization 
Liberalization and privatization are not mounting unquestionably around the 
world. They face some resistance. This part of the chapter focuses on resistance to 
privatization. 
 
The Reasons behind Resistance to Privatization 
Depending on its form pace and intensity privatization, on its own, or as 
an integral component of a wider policy of structural adjustment programmes, is 
bound to have serious consequences on the society at large or on specific groups, 
regions, or sectors
56
.  
 
According to Tironi, resistance to privatization will emerge once people feel and 
realize they are excluded or exploited. However, privatization in less developed countries 
can lead to exclusion or exploitation in two ways. The first way is related to the fact that 
privatization is donor driven in developing countries. The second way is related to the 
nature of privatization that affects distribution and allocation of resources and incomes.  
1) Privatization as donor driven: 
Aid -whether provided by a country or a financial institution- is very much seen 
as donor driven
57
. This means that the donor specifies the amount of aid and the direction 
of aid according to his interests and the acceptance of the recipient country to follow his 
policies or programs
58
. Both state and society share the responsibility of setting the 
pattern in the cases of the weak state- strong society and strong state- weak society while 
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the external actors are much in control and in position to impose their conditions in the 
case of the weak state- weak society, which is the case in many developing countries
59
.  
Thus and expectedly, in a study formed about Structural Adjustment Programmes 
in 1996, it was found that “Local ownership” of individual SAPs was very high in only 
fifth of the programmes while very low in more than the half
60
. In addition, the time 
given to the individual countries to revise and further incorporate their contribution to the 
agreements was very limited
61
. This reflects the low real and genuine contribution of the 
individual countries in the SAPs, which leads to disregarding many important factors in 
such countries
62
. Thus, following reform does not suggest that local actors are satisfied 
about the reform components. Brown Ed in Structural Adjustment: Theory, practice and 
impacts states: 
The apparent consensus would suggest an increasing local ‘ownership’ of 
the reform process, as ‘realist’ governments and bureaucracies are trained in 
‘correct’ economic management – an argument which conveniently forgets the 
assertion that the lack of positive results from adjustment was largely related to 
implementation slippage and a lack of commitment to the reform agenda
63
. 
Analysis of internal politics within adjusting countries is routinely limited to the 
dismissal of opposition to the reform agenda as ‘rent seeking’ behavior from non-
productive interest groups
64
. 
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Christopher Adam and Percy S. Mistry state, “Privatization lies at the heart of 
economic adjustment programs”65. In that sense, privatization programs come as a part of 
the conditionality or the recommendations that less developed countries have to accept in 
order to guarantee the continuation of aid or most accurately ‘finance’. 
Since privatization might be a product of the IMF conditionality, the World 
Bank’s structural adjustment or the donor countries’ pressure, the privatization program 
disregards many things. According to James L. Phelan, the programs or policies of the 
World Bank and IMF create an environment favorable to transnational and multinational 
corporations. In that sense, he continues to argue that those policies are indifferent to all 
countries. In other words, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank give the 
same program of privatization, market liberalization and market based pricing to any 
country regardless its culture, traditions, economic history, or future plans
66
. 
Moreover, the state’s plans of development can contradict with the reform 
package or privatization specifically. Public enterprises can be used as a source of budget 
revenues, employment, deconcentration of economic power, and mobilization of 
industrial capabilities
67
. Hence, privatization may disturb the nature of the economy and 
delay the developmental plans. 
The reform package while changes the role of the state in favor of the market, it 
does not stipulate the existence of any of the important roles of the state that are allowed 
and encouraged within liberalization. Such roles of the state or the government involve 
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solving externalities, monopoly, inefficient resource allocation, etc…68. Solving market 
inefficiency is not always part of the reform package. Thus while some countries proceed 
with privatization, they might forget that they have to enact laws governing monopolies 
(e.g. Egypt) or otherwise they will jeopardize people’s interests and security. 
At the same time, one can not depend on a single package to transfer a country 
from underdevelopment to development or in our case impose privatization to cure all 
diseases disregarding the many internal differences between countries. Countries are very 
different economically, politically, historically, and socially. Disregarding negative or 
positive social capital, the economic culture, the nature of the market, etc… can be 
extremely dangerous.  
The experience of the Czech Republic and transition economies suggests that 
diversity in the nature of developing countries requires the adoption of diverse forms of 
transition. Each different form of transition should take into consideration “the role of the 
legacies of the institutional frameworks and social relations derived from state 
socialism”69. This raises the sense of the ownership of the model and thus the credibility 
and political commitment to the model
70
 . In that sense, no one single program is ever 
suitable to all developing countries or transition economies.  
The IMF and the World Bank do not only neglect differences between countries, 
but they also depend on an illogical principle. They apply programs that succeeded in 
developed countries, which means that they were mainly attached to developed countries 
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at a late phase of their progress and development. Hence, they overlook the prerequisites 
that are needed for the success of such programs
71
.  
In the cases where privatization is imposed from outside, people feel that their 
countries are peripheral and dependent. They feel they are dependent in decision-making, 
finance, capital, goods and services, etc... They realize that their countries are excluded 
from the international process of decision-making. They did not choose to privatize or 
deregulate capital, goods, and services. In addition, they realize that countries at the core 
encourage processes that exploit them and exclude them from competition. Such 
processes work in the interest of the countries that include skilled, well-educated, and 
cheap labor as well as technological, high quality, and competitive products. Hence, the 
entire relation is not in their advantage; instead, it exploits them and excludes them.  
2) The nature of privatization: 
Since privatization by nature redefines the role of the state in the social and 
economic arenas, it touches very sensitive issues in the lives of the people. Some of the 
social and economic goods and services that the state used to provide will be provided by 
the private sector. However, privatization promotes market and commercial ideologies, 
which cherish competition and profit. The private enterprise will seek profit through 
controlling wages, employment, social securities, etc... The problem is worse when such 
ideologies dominate the provision of basic or strategic goods and services. In this case, 
the private enterprise may seek profit through manipulating prices, quantity, or quality, 
which is dangerous.  
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The meaning of privatization depends in practice on a nation's position in 
the world economy. In the wealthier countries, it is easy to treat privatization 
purely as a question of domestic policy. But where the likely buyers are foreign, 
as in the Third World, privatization of state-owned enterprises often means 
denationalization--a transfer of control to foreign investors or managers
72
. 
 
However, private companies, whether domestic or foreign, can adopt the same 
exclusive and exploitive policies. Private domestic companies while pursuing profit and 
seeking their self-interest, they may follow policies similar to the ones followed by the 
multinational corporations. Whether foreign or domestic, the private company seeks 
profit. Thus, it may raise prices, reduce wages, dismiss employees, and reduce social 
securities
73
.  
Firstly, private companies may raise prices in order to maximize their profits. 
Raising prices can be very a sensitive issue when it comes to privatizing natural 
monopolies or infrastructure (for example: health, water, electricity, etc…). In general, all 
what touches strategic and basic goods or services irritates both people and decision 
makers. In the instances where private companies raise the price of a strategic good or 
service, the country’s security and stability becomes threatened. This raises the eternal 
question of “what should be privatized and what should not?”. 
In addition, raising the price of a basic good or service makes normal people 
unable of paying for their basic needs. Privatizing health services, for example, deepens 
inequality and poverty as argued by the International People's Health Council and inflicts 
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what they call “commercial mentality” on the public sector74. Only rich people will be 
able of affording health care. However, the problem is wider because 49% of the 
privatized companies are in the field of infrastructure (see the following chart), which 
threatens more people of cutting or at least reducing their supplies of basic goods and 
services. This leads to more poverty and inequality.  
 
Privatization Proceeds by Sector 1990–99 (US$ billions) 
  
Source: World Bank (2001b) 
Moreover, private companies may reduce the number of workers. They may 
extend working hours and change the organization of work in a way that irritates workers 
or extend their tasks
75
. Extending working hours and work tasks both lead to flattening 
the pyramid of job categories and reducing the number of the staff
76
. In addition, the 
attempt to introduce technology, especially capital-intensive one, in many arenas 
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contributes to reducing the number of workers. All this demonstrate kinds of exploitation 
to workers. 
However, Privatization may also lead to reducing wages and salaries while 
pursuing profit and cutting costs. The high unemployment in many countries helps the 
investor reducing wages, as he is certain he will find workers that accept such low wages. 
Since workers in developing countries will not be able of leaving their jobs because there 
is low or no possibility they will find another one, they will keep working despite the low 
wages. Thus, though low wages may attract investors and may flourish the economy, they 
nevertheless exploit workers since they undermine their efforts and make use of their 
need to the job. 
In general, privatization changes labor relations and conditions. The change in 
labor relations after privatization is explained in Table 2. The table shows the change in 
personnel management, union’s participation, and collective bargaining. True that it 
shows some of the advantages of privatization, but it also shows some factors that make 
workers feel exploited or excluded. Thus, although it shows a shift to flexibility, 
efficiency, quality promoting, and collective or decentralized bargaining, it shows the 
other side too. It shows the shift for less number of workers, lower wages, less internal or 
inside recruitment, more labor instability, less engagement in unions, and less enjoyment 
of unions’ benefits (see Table 2).  Thus, the table explains forms of workers’ exploitation 
and exclusion. For such reasons, workers and unions both resist privatization and attempt 
to reform it. 
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Table 2. Labor relations before and after privatization 
 Before privatization After privatization 
Personnel 
management 
 Preferential salaries, 
additional benefits, 
significant indirect salary 
component  
 Preference in 
recruitment to family 
members of employees 
and unionized workers  
 Internal labour market 
based on length of 
service and experience  
 Reduced daily working 
hours and overtime  
 Labour stability  
 High level of rotation of 
management staff (union 
as stable reference)  
 Overstaffing  
 Reduction of additional 
benefits and indirect salary  
 Internships, bursaries, 
flexible hiring arrangements  
 Internal labour market 
based on formal 
qualifications, high level of 
rotation  
 Flexible working hours, 
reduced overtime  
 Greater internal flexibility  
 Greater discretionary 
powers for enterprise  
 Reductions in staff levels 
(redundancies, retirements, 
etc…)  
Union 
participation 
 Uniform union 
strategies based on claims 
and demands  
 High level of 
participation and union 
membership  
 Selective benefits  
 Diversified and more 
defensive union strategies  
 Lower level of 
participation and union 
membership  
 Abolition of benefits  
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Collective 
bargaining 
 Centralized bargaining  
 One collective 
agreement per enterprise  
 Decentralized bargaining 
by sector  
 Separate collective 
agreements for each 
enterprise  
 
Source:  International Labour Office, Discussion Paper No. 2, Geneva, 1999 
 
Modes of Resistance to Privatization 
There are different modes of resistance to privatization. Resistance to 
privatization does not have a typical mode or form that exists in all countries.  
The exploitation and exclusion resulting from the imposition of privatization lead 
to two forms or modes of resistance. They lead to the resistance of decision makers and 
bureaucrats, which is signified by “lack of political will”. In addition, they lead to public 
resistance or public antagonism. 
The imposition of privatization programs leads to the resistance of some decision 
makers in the recipient country. This problem is known as hesitance of political will or 
lack of political will. The lack of political will and political capacity minimizes the 
chances of having more devoted bureaucracy and sincere plans of privatization, which 
may lead to countering reform. It is true then the statement “privatization is the right tool 
for addressing some problems, but used indiscriminately it can destroy more than it 
fixes”77.  
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On the other hand, if we took in mind the targeted outcomes of privatization, we 
will find that such targeted outcomes can be countered with the lack of political will. The 
two major targeted outcomes of privatization are the maximization of customer 
outcomes, which refers to services’ improvement, and the maximization of system 
outcomes, which refers to services delivery system’s improvement. However, as the 
cliché says, “Privatization is primarily a political process”78, then maximizing the system 
outcomes will not be possible when a hesitant political will exists
79
. Improving the 
delivery system and improving the services both need to be backed with a solid 
determined political will that supervises every thing and issue future plans that would 
solve ongoing errors or inefficiency.    
On the other hand, privatization leads to public resistance. Public resistance refers 
to the resistance of workers, unions, and ordinary people. It also refers to the grassroots’ 
resistance, which as defined above is the responses to privatization by the ordinary 
people, who do not occupy high positions or seize concrete power. People or grassroots 
view the imposition of privatization and the increasing control of foreign enterprises as 
interference in their internal affairs in order to marginalize them and their country. 
The existence of the two types of resistance hinders the path of privatization in 
many developing countries, especially in the Middle East and Africa (see the following 
chart). Obviously, the more privatization is imposed form outside, the slower the course 
of privatization is moving. It is the result of the two modes of resistance. In addition, one 
should not forget that the package imposed from outside disregards differences and is 
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primarily taken from developed countries (who already passed a long path of 
development as stated above), which in itself hinders privatization in each country. 
 
Privatization Proceeds by Region, 1990–2000 (US$ billions) 
 
Source: World Bank (2001b) 
 
However, modes of resistance do not only vary between public and political 
modes of resistance. There are also Scott’s modes of resistance that vary between 
infrapolitics kind of resistance and clear or loud resistance. Infrapolitics resistance refers 
to silent resistance that does not require propaganda or explicit use of power. On the other 
hand, the clear or the loud resistance refers to the apparent resistances that use explicit 
power.  
Modes of resistance can also vary between movements types of resistance and the 
submerged networks. This classification is Polanyi’s classification of resistance. It is 
based on the organizational structure or collective nature of resistance. He also 
differentiates between collective resistance and individual one. It is actually a dichotomy 
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that varies between highest degrees of organization to the lowest degrees of organization. 
Contentious collective actions are much related to social movements and acts of 
confrontation with authorities
80
. They are based on solidarity
81
. On the other hand, 
individual actions are the opposite of collective actions, as they are not directly 
confronting authorities and do not involve high degree of organization.  
Finally, resistance can very according to the scale it reaches or aims at reaching. It 
can vary between global form of resistance that targets the global arena and addresses 
international decision making and local resistance that works locally and targets domestic 
decision making. The two modes agree on the goal but disagree on the mean. 
 
Placing Resistance in an International Context 
Resistance to privatization is experienced in many countries, whether developed 
or less developed as will be shown. The agents of resistance in such countries resist their 
exploitation or exclusion. They use many tactics while resisting. Those tactics vary 
between direct actions, violent actions, media, or legal and formal channels.  
In Bolivia, the people used direct actions to respond to one of the biggest MNCs. 
In 2001, the people made a general strike against Bechtel’s multinational enterprise in 
Cochabamba, a Bolivian city. After the government privatized water, the people were 
very upset and afraid of the changes in the prices of the most vital and needed substance 
in life, water
82
. The decision by Bechtel enterprise, which is the enterprise that came to 
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control water supplies in that area and is known with its clear abuses to environment, to 
raise Water Prices pushed people to organize the general strike
83
. Instability and unrest 
continued for four months after which the government decided to take a move and drive 
the Bechtel enterprise out of Cochabamba.   
In Brazil, the people were able to use media and legal or political channels to 
resist multinational corporations. The grassroots in Brazil developed community bases, 
which stood behind many families that were dismissed out of their lands when some 
MNCs wanted to invest in agriculture using huge plots of land
84
. They raised their 
advocacy before the government as well as used press and media to make all the details 
about the situation published on public. In addition, members of community bases joined 
many other political organizations as well as helped creating some, like unions
85
. They 
realized the importance of having a good mediator or a third party that can mediate 
between them and other MNCs. On the other hand, it is quite an asset to prepare or create 
an ally that can lobby or pressure on MNCs for the grassroots’ interest. In that sense, they 
used political discourses as well as followed the legal channels. 
Wisconsin, the American state, is another case where the grassroots followed the 
political discourses in order to respond to MNCs. Zoltan Grossman and Debi McNutt 
(2000) stated, “Wisconsin is in the midst of one of the biggest upsurges in rural activism 
in decades”86. Grassroots in Wisconsin started four rural alliances in order to face the 
multinational corporations that exploit their lands and lead to environmental devastation. 
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One of the alliances was with the unions against the mining corporations that attempted 
to pollute the river and the underground water with toxic chemicals and acids
87
. Other 
alliances, with the unions and urban organizations, were formed to stop the power plant 
proposals suggested by different MNCs because they did not respect the health and 
environmental laws
88
. Grossman and McNutt concluded that grassroots activism in 
Wisconsin that challenges and opposes the economically and environmentally 
devastating proposals of the MNCs actually asserts the citizens’ control on their 
environment and economy.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter clarified the main theoretical issues concerning privatization and 
resistance. It showed how privatization and liberalization are connected in theory and in 
literature. It also explained the reasons behind resistance to privatization using Tironi’s 
theory, which is based on exclusions and exploitation. The nature of privatization that 
reallocates resources and labor based on commercial standards as well as the fact that 
privatization is ‘imposed’ on LDCs are the main two reasons behind resistance to 
privatization. At last, the modes of resistance and the international context of resistance 
to privatization were reviewed.  
However, it shall be noted that speaking of privatization and resistance does not 
suggest that privatization is always disadvantaged. Privatization attracts capital flows and 
offer new investment opportunities. In addition, it can deal with fiscal deficits, low 
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economic returns, public sector inefficiency, corruption, and high political and 
administrative manipulation
89. It also “allows sectors to function on commercial basis”, 
which means that efficiency, high quality, and wise management of time and resources 
will all be pursued. However, this research seeks to find out the other part of privatization 
that brings resistance. 
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CHAPTER II  
RESISTANCE TO PRIVATIZATION IN EGYPT  
Introduction 
Privatization is being met with resistance in many countries, whether developed 
or less developed. However, the reasons behind resistance to privatization and the modes 
of resistance change from a country to another. The tactics that the agents of resistance 
deploy also change from a country to another.  
This chapter examines resistance to privatization in Egypt. It starts with giving an 
overview about the environment at which privatization was introduced in Egypt. Since 
privatization in Egypt was introduced and derived by IFIs and donor agencies, this in 
itself constituted a reason to resist privatization. Nevertheless, it is only one reason for 
resistance.  
The rest of the chapter explores other reasons behind resistance to privatization in 
Egypt. Such reasons are related to the nature of privatization. The chapter also examines 
the different tactics of resistance that exist in Egypt and the modes of resistance as well. 
Finally, it reviews the implications of resistance. This gives a reliable study to 
“Resistance to Privatization in Egypt”.  
 
Background to Privatization in Egypt 
Attempts to increase investments and encourage private investors are too many in 
the history of Egypt. However, the Infitah or the open door policy that began in 1974 at 
the time of President El Sadat was a major change in the Egyptian economic policies, 
which shifted from nationalization to liberalization and from the adoption of a command 
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system to a market economy
90
. Since that time, there have been many laws enacted to 
encourage investment, like the Law No.43 of 1974 that spurs Arab and foreign 
investment giving more incentives to the investors and its amendment Law No.32 of 
1977 that paves the way for privatization
91
. 
However, after a long decade of the Infitah, Egypt suffered huge declines in 
economic growth. The open door policy left Egypt in deep economic imbalances 
reflected in a nominal inflation rate of 15% and a real inflation rate of 25%
92
, a budget 
deficit of 17% of the GDP, and a deficit in the balance of payment of about LE 11.4 
billion
93
. In short, there have been many monetary and fiscal problems and distortions. 
Thus, by the end of 1980s, the need for reform was highly assured.  
However, the public sector reform, specifically, was an issue that needed real 
attention in the economic reform program. There were many reasons behind this. One of 
those reasons is that although the open door policies were mainly adopted for the purpose 
of encouraging the private sector and private investment, there was no tangible success in 
spurring private investment. By the end of 1980s, the public sector was controlling 80% 
of the import/export as well as 90% of the banking and insurance sectors
94
. In addition, 
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the 1987 reform efforts that were presented upon the advice of the World Bank and the 
IMF to restructure the public sector were met with failure
95
. 
Moreover, there have been no real attempts to transfer some of the state domains 
or roles to the private sector. Table 3 shows how by the end of 1980s the share of the 
private sector in investment was far below the half and its share in employment was 
slightly more than the half. In addition, the statistics in the report released by the 
Egyptian Public Enterprise Office show that at the same period the public sector was in 
control of 76% of the investment. Whether 61% as in Table 3 or 76%, the two 
percentages reveal the big share of the public sector in investment despite all its 
inconveniencies. Thus, the public enterprise was a sector that was seen in need of major 
reforms that would put the private sector in better control.  
 
Table 3. The percentage of the private sector share in investment and employment 
Sectors Year: 1987 
% of private 
1) Investment: 
Total commodity service sectors 
Total service sectors 
Total social services sectors 
Grand total 
 
 
44.6 
26.2 
42.4 
39.0 
2) Employment: 
Total commodity sectors 
Total service sectors 
Total social service sectors 
Grand total 
 
81.5 
68.7 
36.1 
66.4 
 
Source: The World Bank, Private sector development in Egypt (report for the conference 
on the Private sector development in Egypt: investing in the future), 1994. 
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The performance of the Egyptian public sector also had fallen into many 
deadlocks. The Egyptian public enterprises actually operate on a system mixture between 
profit making enterprises (260 enterprises) and loss making enterprises (56 enterprises). 
This system led to losses of about LE 2.37 billion. In total, the public sector was indebted 
with about LE 47 billion
96
. Subsequently, this constituted high burdens on the capabilities 
of the government and the state.  
In addition, the public sector suffered other problems concerning human 
resources. The Egyptian public sector is overstaffed and usually tolerates the 
unproductive and unskilled labor. This situation is inherited from the 1950s to mid 1970s 
policies that allowed the Egyptian government to emerge as the major employer that 
employed more than the third of the labour force
97
.  
The existence of all these problems in a sector that controls the biggest share of 
investment is a real problem. This means that the investments will not be efficient or 
productive. As Carana Corporation states “while the PE’s in Egypt was receiving the 
lion’s share of the investment in the productive sectors of the economy, the return on the 
capitol was gradually decreasing and by 1989 reached a low by 5.9% while the average 
interest rate was 14%”98. Hence, the public investments were not circulated in new 
businesses or used to create more employment opportunities although they are obliged to 
hire them in order to accommodate the increasing unemployment. 
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Privatization in Egypt 
In an attempt to solve the many economic inconveniences in general and the 
problems of the public sector in particular, Egypt accepted to undergo another reform 
program that depends on privatization. Privatization, as stated in the previous chapter, 
reduces expenditure, achieves stabilization, and improves the supply side through better 
resources allocation. In that sense and in theory, it represents a cure to many diseases, 
however still in theory. 
The privatization program in Egypt started under the auspices of the IMF and the 
World Bank as a part of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment program 
(ERSAP). The program as declared by the IMF and the World Bank is a market-oriented 
program that puts the private sector in control
99
. The clear thing is that the program or the 
‘package of policies related to liberalization’100 is the initiative of the IMF and the World 
Bank and is a part of their conditionality, which brings us back to the problems of 
‘imposing’101 privatization that were referred to in the previous chapter and will be 
explained in more details later in this chapter.  
The privatization program in Egypt, which was initiated through the creation of 
the PEO (Public Enterprise Office) as an independent advisory body
102
, started in early 
1991. It was constituted of two phases. The first phase of the program involved the 
“divestment of the public sector holdings in production and manufacturing 
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companies”103. The second phase of the program involved encouraging investment in 
sectors that have been historically administrated and controlled by the government (e.g. 
electricity). The implementation of each phase required the utilization of one or two 
approaches.  
Two approaches were used to achieve the first phase of the program. The first 
approach involved the sale of the share of public enterprises in the stock market. The 
second approach involved selling them to anchor investors (see the first and second row 
in Table 4). As a result of following those two approaches, Egypt managed to sell four 
companies to ‘strategic inventors’ (e.g. Pepsi Cola, Coca Cola, Egyptian bottling 
company, El Nasr bottling Company, etc…). Moreover, Egypt succeeded at earning 
about 2.6 billion LE out of its selling to twenty-seven public enterprise in the stock 
market. However, the earnings stopped at 2.9 billion £E in 1996
104
.   
At the second phase of the privatization program, a different approach was 
required. Because this phase involved encouraging investment in sectors that had been 
historically administrated and controlled by the government, the used approach entailed 
the enactment of new laws and legislations by the government. The objective of such 
laws or legislations was to facilitate the private investments in the public sector. The law 
203 of 1991 is a major example of this approach. The law includes the privatization of 
314 State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
105
. However, only slightly more than the half of this 
number was privatized and still partially (see Table 4). 
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Table 4. The record of privatization in Egypt 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Public enterprise, Public enterprise office 
No. of  
Privatization 
Technique 
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Aggregat
e No. of 
companie
s 
 
 1.  Majority 
or all 
through 
 the Stock 
 Market 
0 
 
 
0 1 14 14 8 0 1 0 0 38 
 2.  Anchor 
 Investor 
0 
 
3 0 3 3 2 9 5 4 0 29 
 3. Employee 
Shareholder 
Associations 
0 
 
7 3 0 3 12 5 0 2 2 34 
 4.  40% 
 through the 
 stock 
market 
0 
 
1 2 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 10 
 5.  Trenches 
 less than 
 50% 
0 
 
 
0 4 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 
 6.  Sold as 
 assets 
6 
 
2 2 1 3 6 7 3 2 1 33 
 7. Factories 
 and 
 production 
 lines 
0 
 
0 0 1 1 3 4 6 3 3 21 
8.  Long 
term 
lease 
0 0 0 0 2 0 6 10 2 0 20 
 Aggregate 6 
 
13 12 25 28 32 31 25 13 6 191 
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The privatization program in Egypt was stalled in 1998. It reflected the statement 
of Boyan Belev who said that privatization in Egypt is not accompanied with the public 
support and social forces that can push it forward
106
.  
 
Resistance to Privatization in Egypt 
The stall of the privatization program reflects a very important fact. It reflects that 
resistance to privatization in Egypt is very strong and is capable of breaking the course of 
privatization. Local resistance to privatization in particular is and has been influential in 
resisting privatization.  
Some scholars argue that resistance should be formed globally and specifically on 
the level of the developed countries and not locally or on the level of developing 
countries. Samir Amin (1999) argues that resisting liberalization and privatization is not 
efficient in developing countries. He argues that resistance that comes from such 
countries is very weak because it reflects the weakness of their countries
107
. Such 
countries from the beginning accepted and submitted to the rules and conditionality 
imposed on them. Thus, he believes that the effective resistance is the global resistance 
and the ones formed in the developed countries themselves against their unfair liberal 
policies.  
Another proponent of this argument is the Anti-globalization movement in Egypt. 
The Anti-globalization movement in Egypt does not promote resistance inside Egypt. In 
other words, they do not work locally. In the interview with an activist and a founding 
member in the anti-globalization movement in Cairo, he justified their attitude by saying 
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that their lack of money, resources, and personals makes them in a position of choosing 
whether to work locally or globally. In his words he stated, “What can we choose: to 
spend our resources and waste our time on local resistance that do not bring out tangible 
outcomes on the short run or on the macro level or, in contrast, mobilize our resources in 
a direct strategy that can bring out national outcomes?” (see Annex 4).   
For the anti-globalization movement, working globally means that they will 
engage directly with the international decision makers. Since privatization is imposed 
from outside, they believe they have to deal with the outside, convince them, pressure 
them, or intimidate them to reach the targeted change. This will subsequently bring out 
new decisions that bind the national and international community. On the other hand, it 
will not take much time as working with workers and local resistance and trying to 
organize them in order to make them effective while pressuring local decision makers. 
The answer of the anti-globalization movement to the earlier question was very 
practical. They chose to utilize their limited time and resources in a strategy that would 
bring out tangible outcomes in the short run and on the macro level. Thus, it is logical to 
find very few cases of resistance to privatization that the anti-globalization movement 
managed to play a role in. The rest of their activities vary between organizing 
international conferences and organizing global demonstrations or media campaigns.   
However, there is another argument that defends local resistance and argues it is 
effective and can generate change. On the long run and cumulatively, local resistance can 
reach the decision makers outside. The review reports and the transparency policy of the 
World Bank and the IMF will show such resistance. This can generate indirect pressure 
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on the international decision makers. Such pressure threatens their reputation and 
questions their decisions in the developing countries. 
Furthermore, although local resistance may not directly reach the international 
decision makers, it reaches the decision makers inside the country. Using tactics of 
resistance locally, whether such tactics relied on direct actions, media, or legal channels, 
threatens of political unrest and public dissatisfaction
108
. Subsequently it pushes decision 
makers to change their agendas and encourages them to think of alternatives
109
.  Hence, 
local resistance is, to an extent, sufficient to change the policy action inside the country.  
The rest of the chapter shows the reasons and motives behind resistance to 
privatization in Egypt (whether local or global). It also reviews the different tactics that 
the agents of resistance deploy in order to affect the decision-makers. In addition, the 
chapter explains the modes of resistance that exist in Egypt. Finally, it reveals the gainers 
and the losers of such resistance. 
 
The Reasons behind the Existence of Resistance to Privatization in Egypt 
There are many challenges that face the privatization process in Egypt. Such 
challenges constitute motives for resistance when they are failed to be addressed. The 
challenges are: 
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1) The existence of many companies that contain large numbers of employees, which 
raises the costs of production and leads to the indebtedness of the company.  In turn, this 
requires cutting down the employees’ numbers and wages in order to reduce costs110 
For example, the decision to privatize a company like Kafr Eldawar Spinning and 
Weaving would be an irritating decision to many workers and employees. The Company 
employs more that 350,000 employees. Most of them do not do any job and if the 
company is privatized, the investor will not keep them (see Annex 5). The resistance of 
such huge number of workers can lead to instability and public unrest. 
2) The failure of some privatized companies that were used to yielding profits before 
being sold, which leads to the loss of many jobs and the decrease of wages
111
.  
3) Most importantly is the failure of some Employee Share Holder Associations, which 
threatens of canceling this option that represents one of the favorable and desirable 
solutions to the workers
112
. 
When the privatization decision comes to any company, workers at such company 
pressure to buy their company instead of having it sold to an investor. The “Employee 
Share Holder Association” is a very good option in front of workers. It absorbs their 
resistance to privatization because they feel they own their company. However, 
sometimes the employees manage to pay the regular payments in the specified times, like 
the case of Egyptian Springs Company and some other times they fail to pay the 
payments, like the case of Alex Cooling Company (see Annex2).  
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At the Alex Cooling, the employees insisted on buying their company. However, 
they faced financial problems, which made them unable of paying the regular payments. 
They were also unable of renewing the old refrigerators in order to make their service 
competitive. The lack of finance and resources led to the cancellation of the Employees 
Shareholders Association (see Annex2). 
Employees Shareholders Associations should be applied in certain cases; 
otherwise, it will fail. Only if the company is not meeting strong competition or 
demanding continuous finance, Employees Shareholders Associations can succeed. In the 
words of the privatization assessment expert: 
An Employee Share Holder is successful only when the company does not 
need more money to be pumped into it and, at the same time, there is no outside 
competition with it. In general, Employee Share Holders do not have resources 
that can create money like an investor. In addition, they are incapable of 
managing an administration and making plans and strategies that allow them to 
face competition because 1) they lake experience, 2) they don’ take risk and 3) 
they lake the capability of scientific analysis (Annex 3). 
 
The failure of many workers to continue paying the payments regularly and the 
application of Employees Shareholders Associations in the wrong cases made decision 
makers think twice before giving workers this option. They started to think about the 
costs, the sources of finance, the ability to face competition, etc… However, this deprives 
workers from their way-out of the privatization decision, which highly irritates workers. 
Failure to settle the three challenges increases the probability of having resistance. 
Being unable of operating successful companies and pressuring the employees to leave 
their jobs will most probably bring out resistance. In addition, removing the option of the 
workers buying their own company aggravates resistance. 
 53 
 
Other factors also lead to resistance to privatization in Egypt. Such factors are 
affected by the way the privatization program was introduced in Egypt and the nature of 
privatization itself. They both lead to exploitation and exclusion in different kinds and 
degrees, which as discussed in the previous chapter justify resistance.  
However, each of the two factors provokes certain mode of resistance more than 
the other. Introducing the Privatization Program as a part of the IMF and the World Bank 
package provokes politicians and educated people more than uneducated ones (since only 
educated and knowledgeable people will know this information). They realize that 
privatization in this case does not take into consideration the diversity in economic 
history, culture in general and economic culture in particular, as well as the social 
formation of the society. For example, the IMF and the World Bank recommended 
raising the prices of basic services like electricity and water, which would have led to 
another increase in the prices of basic industries like sugar and fertilisers
113
. They 
overlooked the percentage of the poor in Egypt, disregarded the great dependence of the 
people on the public provision of basic good and services, and ignored the history of the 
Egyptians in forming riots in response to raising the prices of basic goods.  
On the other hand, the nature of privatization in Egypt provokes workers and 
ordinary people. In his report, Sides of the Egyptian experience in reforming the public 
enterprises sector, Mohamed Hasouna states that the nature of privatization in Egypt 
involves restructuring the public sector technically and financially. It also involves 
introducing a source of foreign capital and deploying new technology
114
. Thus, the nature 
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of privatization actually provokes workers and ordinary people because it touches their 
livings, careers and independency from foreign intervention.   
Privatization is resisted in Egypt for the following reasons: 
1) Since the privatization program in Egypt started under the auspices of the World Bank 
and is a part of the IMF conditionality, which gives an indication that it was not approved 
with the free will of the country, it raises some policy makers and public antagonism to 
what they call re-colonization.   
Mahmoud Mohieledin and Sahar Nasr stated, “The privatization program can be a 
means to obtain the approval of the World Bank and the IMF on debt rescheduling by 
satisfying part of their conditionality. In this case government many not be convinced or 
genuine in the proposition and implementation of the privatization program which can be 
described as window dressing”115. Since many people realize that privatization is one of 
the components of the package of reform that Egypt had to accept in order to guarantee 
the services of the World Bank and the IMF, they find this a reason for resistance. They 
feel that their country and decision makers were excluded from real decision-making. 
Reading the literature of four of the most important Egyptian parties, the ruling 
party or the NDP (National Democratic Party), the Labor Party, the Wafd Party, and the 
NPUP (National Progressive Unionist Party), one would easily know that all the political 
forces in Egypt value the role of the public sector in economic and social development. 
For the NPUP, ‘the public sector plays the major role in leading development’116. For the 
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Labor Party, ‘the public sector reflects our economic capabilities’117. For the Wafd Party, 
‘the public sector is necessary for securing the appropriate surplus contributing in the self 
financing of development’118. For the NDP, before 1992, the public sector was ‘leading 
the developmental process’. However, this changed after 1992 and the public sector 
became only ‘the planner and supervisor of productive activities and utilities’119.  
In addition, observing the declarations of president Mohamed Hosni Mobarak 
shows that the shift to privatization, especially privatization of ownership, happened at 
the start of the1990s. Before that date, he used to declare that ‘we don’t sell the public 
sector, it is the pillar of the country, we are continuously developing it’120, ‘we don’t sell 
the public sector…we don’t dissolve it and this should be clear for all’121, and most 
importantly ‘I don’t support the selling of the public sector’122. These statements 
coincided with political (formal) and popular antagonism toward liberalization
123
. Hence, 
it was logical to find the first statement of Nabeeh shabana -the representative of the 
labor syndicate in the Delta for fertilisers- and his first reason for resistance: “we all 
know this privatization is imposed on us from abroad, it is not the sincere wish of the 
people or the government. It is compliance to the global trends and external pressures” 
(annex9). It was also not surprising to find in an article for a well known Egyptian 
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economic professor, Nazli M. Ahmed, statements like ‘the influence exercised by 
international powers and financial corporations’124, ‘pressure’125, ‘blackmailing and 
intervening in our policies’126, ‘hidden facts concerning the negotiations with the IMF 
and the World Bank’127, and ‘the negative impact of dependence on the U.S, the World 
Bank, and the IMF in terms of grants’128. Academics, politicians, and ordinary people in 
Egypt criticize privatization because it was primarily introduced by external institutions. 
The NPUP, the labor party, and other parties (e.g. Nasserite Party) were extremely 
afraid of “external dependence’ especially with the declining level of planning in 
Egypt
129
. For them, this would result in bias to the private sector at the expense of the 
public sector and its important in role in development and industrialization
130
. Accepting 
the terms and policies of the World Bank and IMF without deliberating them 
professionally and discussing their requirements as well as their social and future 
economic effect is a real problem
131
. Sunita Kikeri and John Nellis argue that a tailored 
privatization is a core condition to the absence of resistance
132
 because as Narjess 
Boubakri and Jean-Claude Cosset state, “the privatization experience of industrialized 
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countries does not address the problems of unsophisticated or underdeveloped capital 
markets and thus cannot be generalized to developing countries”133.  
2) Many Egyptians are dissatisfied with selling or giving up public ownership especially 
to foreign and multinational enterprises. It raises their sense of insecurity and arouses 
their feeling of a “conspiracy” that is being planned against them, which is actually part 
of the Egyptian culture.   
Moukhtar Khattab, the minister of the Public Business Sector was one of the main 
opponents to the sale of public enterprises. He was convinced that selling public 
enterprises to foreign enterprises is not the solution to the Egyptian Economic problems 
(Annex 1). The NPUP also recognized the complexity of the Egyptian economy crisis 
that can not be reduced and solved through “privatization”, especially that there is no 
certainty that the private sector is more efficient than the public one
134
.  
Privatization in Egypt became a goal in itself and not a means to reach efficiency 
and increase production. Many places though their administration was privatized and 
succeeded in achieving high returns, they were sold to the private sector and to foreign 
investors in particular (e.g. hotels), which is unjustifiable because the objective of 
privatization was primarily achieved with privatizing the administration. In addition, 
many successful companies that have effective administration and earn high profits were 
put to sale. If it is logical to sell or liquidize the failing public enterprises, selling the 
profitable ones will only ‘dispose’ the public sector135. All these facts raise the people’ 
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sense of insecurity and make them unsure of what is going to be sold and what will 
happen if it is sold. 
3) Once private enterprises hold the management of the public sector companies, they 
sacrifice many workers. They justify their actions by declaring that such workers are 
uncompetitive, unskilled, and are going to be substituted with new machineries.  
The decision to bring new machineries instead of the old refrigerators in Alex 
Cooling Company was one of the reasons behind workers’ resistance. The investor was 
going to buy modern and big refrigerators. Such refrigerators do not need many workers, 
which means that the rest of the workers will be dismissed (Annex 2). 
In addition, some investors dismiss workers directly. An example for direct dismissal of 
workers is the Farascore factory. In the Farascore factory, 500 workers were dismissed
136
.  
Thus, although the government in 1992 emphasized that ‘not a single worker’ will be 
dismissed or even harmed because of privatization, the government promises did not 
materialize
137
. 
Dismissing workers is a strong reason for workers to resist. Workers’ resistance in 
the Upper Egypt (Sohag) Spinning and Weaving Company resulted from the investor’s 
policy to dismiss workers and cut their wages (Annex 2). On the other hand, workers’ 
resistance in Egyptian Springs Company also resulted from their feeling that their careers 
and incomes are threatened (Annex 2).  
The Early retirement policy is one of the very well known policies used when the 
company is privatized in order to force or seduce workers and employees to leave their 
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jobs. However, the early retirement policy has many economic and social effects. In a 
study made upon the request of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation by the Research 
and Study Center about the social and economic implications of the early retirement 
policy, many things were found. It was found that 48.6 % of the early-retired personals 
could not work in any other job and could not invest their money anywhere, which means 
they suffered unemployment. In addition, only 8.5% of early-retired personals succeeded 
at starting a new private project. It was also found that the economic situation of 50.5 % 
of early-retired personals highly deteriorated
138
. The workers usually spend their money 
on consumptive goods and unproductive actions like renewing the house, increasing the 
monthly spending, etc... 
On the social side, 44.3% of the early-retired personals felt their social status is 
clearly damaged with their retirement while only 7.8% felt it improved. In addition, the 
social relations of 24.7% of the early-retired personals were worsened and 22.7% of the 
early-retired personals started to have family instability and family disputes
139
.  
Although the decision to early retire is a voluntary decision, workers may find 
themselves obliged to take this decision because of “managerial reasons” or reasons 
related to the Workplace policies and strategies. It was found that 59.3% of the early-
retired personals retire for such reasons. Managerial reasons are recalled when the 
workers or the employees are threatened to be dismissed or reassigned in another 
distanced place or different low level job, or they are threatened to continue working 
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without promotions
140
. Cutting their privileges is actually the hardest managerial reason 
that the study found can lead to retirements. The emergence of managerial pressures and 
instability in the workplace leave workers with no option but to retire or leave their jobs. 
4) The managerial pressures, whether led to early retirement or not, create resistance. In 
the instances where the private enterprises keep the workers, they offer no or low social 
security systems and most probably cut down wages. Private companies’ main goal is 
holding competition, maximizing profit (lowering cost and increasing returns), and 
achieving efficiency
141
, which may overlook to the social side including wages, health 
and environmental problems, etc… The workers, thus, find working in the public sector 
secure compared to working in the private sector
142
. 
One of the reasons that pushed the workers in the Delta for fertilizers to resist 
privatization is their belief that they will not be given their share in the profit as they were 
used to under the public sector. They knew that a profit seeking investor would keep the 
profit or invest it in more capital. He would not think of giving the workers their share in 
the profits (Annex 2). 
5) Privatization some times does not lead to competition. For example, in the cases of 
natural monopolies (e.g. privatizing the Egyptian public telecommunication company and 
garbage collecting), the private enterprise is not encouraged to be competitive
143
 because 
it already controls the market. In this case, it controls the prices, dictates its own rules, 
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and does not necessarily bring out an efficient good or service at last, which raises more 
resistance. 
In the case of garbage collecting, the franchise given to the foreign private 
company did not bring out competition or efficiency. The private company monopolized 
the service of garbage collecting in the Cairo district. The domestic groups that used to 
collect the garbage were banned by new laws and legislations from collecting them. With 
the absence of competition with other service providers, the foreign company was not 
encouraged to provide a good or cheap service. They are certain that whatever they 
provide, the people will not have any option but to purchase it since no body else 
provides the service. 
 Hence, they started dictating their rules. They raised the price of the service. 
They offered law quality service as they started leaving the garbage in their baskets for 
long time and refused to recycle them. In addition, instead of taking the garbage from 
each apartment, people had to bring them down and put them in the baskets, which was 
part of the job of the traditional garbage collectors. 
6) Privatizing public natural monopolies, basic or strategic goods and services, or goods 
and services that the government was used to subsidize generates resistance and 
dissatisfaction. This revives the debate about “what should be privatized?”.  
All the political parties in Egypt agree that strategic items or sectors should not be 
exposed to sale
144
. According to the senior administrator who worked in the privatization 
unit until 1998, Minister Moukhtar Khattab and others strongly opposed the idea of 
privatizing the provision of basic goods as well as privatizing strategic sectors, like water, 
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roads, etc…. They were concerned about the ability of the poor people to fulfill their 
basic needs in the light of the possible increases in prices and changes in quantities. 
However, there is no agreement between any of the concerned parties on a definition to 
what is considered ‘strategic’145, which unfortunately leaves a large room for maneuver. 
However, the public provision of basic goods is quite important to maintain a 
level of social justice. Raising the prices of basic goods or reducing their quantity or 
quality is an issue that can jeopardize national security and political stability
146
. 
Especially that the rate of poverty is very high in Egypt, many people are worried of 
privatizing basic goods. The non-poor are also worried since they fear such items become 
scarce in the future.  
In addition to the previous reasons of resistance, other justifications were, 
occasionally, given to the existence of resistance to privatization. Some people and 
parties (the NPUP and the Labor Party) resisted privatization because it contradicted with 
the Egyptian constitution, which states that public ownership is the people’s ownership 
and thus, the Egyptian people are the only authority capable of selling what they privately 
own
147
.  Some political parties brought the argument further to say that the Egyptian 
government did not represent the will of the people in regard to the privatization decision, 
which, in turn, shook the basis of the Social contract between the people and the 
government
148
. 
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Another criticism to privatization that brought resistance is the fact that the same 
administrators that worked in the public sector and were responsible of its inefficiency 
took charge of privatization. The heads of the holding companies who are not formally 
accountable to any authority became responsible of choosing what to sell and then selling 
it
149
.  Privatization was also criticized and resisted for its allowance to foreign investors 
specifically to run public enterprises, to control the provision of goods and services, and 
to have a big share in Egypt’s GNP150.  
All these factors derive resistance to privatization. However, it is not enough to 
have the motive for resistance (this motive reflects different levels of exclusion and 
exploitation), it is equally important to pressure for reform through tactics of resistance. 
 
Tactics of Resistance to Privatization in Egypt 
Different tactics of resistance are deployed in Egypt. Each resisting strategy or 
action is a reflection of the social structure at which it is originated. It is also a reflection 
of the culture, education, personnel and group attitudes, resources acquisition, and the 
ability to influence and reach power. Agents of resistance can choose from direct actions, 
media, or instigate legal and formal proceedings. 
1) The use of direct actions:  
Direct actions include protests, demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts. They 
constitute pressure on the concerned party, whether the government or the investor. This 
pressure pushes the concerned party to take an action that accommodates the resisting 
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groups and their demands. James Lobe states “Demonstrations, protests, and strikes are a 
legitimate way for many people to let both their governments and the international 
community know that policies are not working. In some cases, it is the only option 
left”151. 
Protests, demonstrations, and strikes have certain characteristics. They are 
confrontational and expressive
 152
. They are confrontational in the sense that they involve 
claims against certain groups or elites, which makes them confront with each other
153
. 
Such claims contradict with an existing situation and ask for reversing it. The claims 
often involve symbolic and non-negotiatable demands, which make them expressive
 154
. 
Protests, demonstration, and strikes are also direct and disruptive. They are direct 
because they directly threaten the interests of certain group through using violent or non-
violent means. They are also disruptive because they disrupt the existing situation with 
the raised claims, demands as well as actions. The four characteristics make direct actions 
very dangerous as they generate instability and challenge the power arrangements as 
well. 
However, for the same characteristics, the decision to use direct actions is very 
risky and costly.  It is not easy to decide to resort to direct actions because they lead to 
confrontations with authorities or elites. In addition, they disrupt the regime’s stability. 
Thus, as Tarrow states, “the probability that people will use disruptive direct action varies 
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as a function of the depth of their grievances, the availability of alternative means of  
expression, the perceived costs and risks of the collective action, and the presence or 
absence of prospective organizers”155. All these factors affect the decision of the agents 
of resistance to use direct actions. 
The Egyptian labor syndicates for trade, engineering, and chemical industries 
frequently deploy direct actions. They actually reject privatization totally. They do not 
ask for reforming it; rather, they ask for abolishing it
156
. During 1991- 1995, they formed, 
organized and guided more than 65 strikes or demonstrations
157
. 
An example to Workers resistance to privatization using direct actions is the 
‘Qaha’ case. At the Qaha Company for food, the Workers and the Labor union headed by 
Ms. Gamalat made demonstrations and strikes against the investor (annex 3). They 
created an unstable environment for the investor. Thus, the investor did not risk his 
business and refused to pay the rest of the payment and the company was returned to the 
holding Company (public sector) (annex 3). 
2) The use of media: 
Media and press are very crucial links between people and policymakers (in 
governments and private enterprises). When the people turn an issue to the media, the 
media collect evidence, gather different opinions, and then bring the issue out. The policy 
makers, in turn, start to be aware of the gravity of the issue and the scale of resistance and 
thus they are much likely to respond to it.  
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Media can also intensify an issue making it a subject of public opinion. It steers 
people’s emotion and mentality concerning a certain topic like privatization. It also 
informs the people about the possible negatives or side effects. Once people are informed 
about the issue and its side effects, they, in turn, pressure decision makers. Then the issue 
starts to be a matter of threat to the reputation of private enterprises and the credibility of 
the government.   
The effect of the media is not the outcome of few messages “but is due to the 
aggregate impact of a very large number of messages, each of which has a different 
content, but all of which deal with the same general issue
158”. Thus, the extensive 
discussion and deliberation of a certain issue in the media is one of the ways by which 
people can affect the agenda of the investors or governments.   
The General Federation of Labor Unions (GFLU) uses this strategy (media & 
press) severally in order to resist privatization. The GFLU does not totally reject 
privatization. Thus, it does not attempt to destroy it; instead, it asks for reforming it. It 
sends letters to news agencies. In such letters, it demands national authorities not to sell 
any enterprise without trying all other options and if decided to sell, they should give 
priority to the employees working in those enterprises and to Egyptian entrepreneurs
159
. It 
also asks them not to sell the public enterprises to foreign investors (non-Arabs 
particularly) unless there is no way else
160
. 
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In addition, the GFLU sends some messages through media to the people and the 
decision makers. They send the people awareness messages that notify them with the side 
effects of privatization. They also send decision makers messages -through the media- 
with there demands which are usually related to organizing the relationship between the 
workers and the administration.  
3) Instigating legal proceedings: 
 Legal and formal channels represent the very legitimate path of preserving rights. 
However, using the legal and political discourses is not that easy in reality. It consumes a 
lot of money, takes long time, and needs great experience to pursue one’s rights 
politically (formally) or legally.  
Using legal and political channels is not always that easy for many reasons. It 
takes workers long time and great expertise to pursue their rights politically or legally. 
Raising a case in the courts, forming political alliances, or lobbying in national 
parliaments takes time and effort in negotiations. In addition, it requires following the 
certain legal rules and procedures, keeping an eye on the whole situation in the future, 
and implementing the legal penalty enacted in the case or the consequences resulting 
form the alliance. They also need large experience in legal matters or negotiations and 
compromises. Thus, making the decision of using legal and political channels bears high 
opportunity cost (money, time, and power relations).   
In addition, to media, the GFLU follow the legal and formal channels in order to 
reform privatization. They send their letters not only to the news agencies but also to the 
government officials. They even sent their above-mentioned demands to the prim 
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minister and the chief of the GFLU sent a letter to the president Mubarak
161
. The GFLU 
also personally met the prim minister and other ministers to explain as well as defend 
their perspective regarding privatization
162
. Moreover, the members of the GFLU 
attended several sessions in the people’s assembly in an attempt to lobby for the labor’s 
interests and demands
163
.  In that sense, they pursued formal channels, whether executive 
or legislative. 
An example to instigating legal proceeding is the Helwan Cement case. In 
Helwan Cement, the investor dismissed many workers; thus, the workers, the labor union 
and labor syndicates started to resist this investor. They started to suit him in courts and 
aroused public opinion against him. The privatization assessment expert state in regard to 
this case that “this investor is an example to rigid inventors who do not know how to deal 
with social forces and formal channels” (annex 3).  
 
The Modes of Resistance to Privatization in Egypt 
The reasons of resistance stated above do not only provoke ordinary people and 
grassroots, but they also provoke decision makers. This means that two modes of 
resistance exist in Egypt. The two modes are the public resistance mode of resistance and 
the decision makers’ mode of resistance.  
The public mode of resistance is very dangerous since it jeopardizes the country’s 
security and stability. The 1.3 million public enterprise employees are a real impediment 
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to the continuity and expansion of the privatization process
164
. Their fear of being 
dismissed, losing privileges, or being pressured to leave their jobs arouse there resistance, 
which, in turn, destabilizes the country’s security. 
On the other hand, many factors arouse political resistance. Introducing 
privatization by external agencies and dealing with privatization as the only solution to 
all the problems are examples to such factors that provoke decision makers. In the above-
mentioned reasons of resistance, Mahmoud Mohieledin and Sahar Nasr stated, “The 
privatization program can be a means to obtain the approval of the World Bank and the 
IMF on debt rescheduling by satisfying part of their conditionality. In this case 
government many not be convinced or genuine in the proposition and implementation of 
the privatization program which can be described as window dressing”165. This actually 
reflects the resistance of the decision makers. 
 In addition, decision makers, like minister Moukhtar Khattab, might sympathize 
with the workers and their status, which “is extremely behind their counterparts in 
developing countries as they do not have the same salaries, promotions, or privileges” 
(Annex 5). As the senior official who worked in the Privatization Program until 1998 
states: 
Decision makers resisting privatization can actually change the path of 
privatization and its speed. They can delay the decisions of privatizing companies 
when they find it against workers and employees. They can actually constitute a 
real threat on the discourse of privatization. Their resistance is dangerous and 
very direct (annex 3). 
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Thus, privatization is not only met with public antagonism but is also met with 
some policy-makers’ dissatisfaction. 
The modes of resistance to privatization in Egypt are also mixture of visible or 
explicit resistance and infrapolitics kind of resistance. The modes of resistance in Egypt 
are not completely visible depending on the above-mentioned clear and declared tactics 
of resistance. Workers in few sectors, such as postal and health criticize privatization 
only rhetorically without actually using any explicit tactic or strategy to resist it
166
. They 
attack privatization in their daily life, in their speaking, but do not resort to any action in 
order to express their resistance. However, unlike Tarrow’s explanation for this kind of 
infrapolitics resistance on the basis of culture, this form of resistance to privatization is 
much related to the fact that these fields are somehow far from the threat of 
privatization
167
. Thus, workers in such fields are less likely to confront directly with 
national authorities or spend their time, money, and resources tracing media or formal 
channels.  
On the contrary to the infrapolitics mode of resistance, there is the clear and 
visible mode of resistance to privatization that deploys the above-mentioned direct and 
clear tactics, like direct actions, media, etc. This mode of resistance represents many 
resisting groups since they all feel threatened by privatization.  
On the other hand, the Egyptian modes of resistance to privatization are mixture 
of global and local resistance. However, the global mode of resistance is much concerned 
with the international arena and is interested in the catching light broad issues. The global 
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mode of resistance represented in the Egyptian anti-globalization movement is directed 
toward issues that attract attention, like the war on Iraq. It also addresses “Globalization” 
and fights it globally. The anti-globalization movement resistance to privatization in 
Egypt is limited. Thus, the modes of resistance to privatization inside Egypt are more 
local than global. 
At last, the modes of resistance to privatization that exist in Egypt vary in degrees 
with regard to their organizational structure and their collectivity. Resistance to 
privatization in Egypt varies between social movements that acquire high levels of 
organizational structure and social networks that acquire low level of organizational 
structure. Although resistance in Egypt rarely evolves to the level of movements, it can 
be accompanied with the support of labor union and labor syndicates’ activists, who 
organize, guide, and help performing tactics of resistance (e.g. the case of Qaha and 
Helwan Cement)
168
. This reflects high level of collective action. In contrary to this high 
level of collective action, individual resistance to privatization also exists in Egypt. Thus, 
in addition, the degrees of collective action differ in each resistance 
 
Concluding Remarks 
As Mohieledin and Nasr concluded “In view of the unpopularity of privatization 
in Egypt, concerns of political instability, fears of worsening the sever unemployment 
problem (already 17.5%), privatization of SOEs has been lagging behind its schedule”169. 
Resistance to privatization in Egypt is the product of many factors. It is the 
product of many reasons; each of them reflects different degree and type of exploitation 
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and exclusion. Such reasons of resistance led to the mergence of two modes of resistance, 
the public and political modes of resistance. This means that the public and the politicians 
or the decision makers are actually backing this resistance. In other words, resistance in 
Egypt is a process that happens in the top ranks and at the bottom as well. 
However, there are other modes of resistance that exist in Egypt, such as 
infrapolitics mode of resistance, explicit mode of resistance, organized mode of 
resistance, unorganized mode of resistance, local modes of resistance, and global mode of 
resistance. The modes of resistance are accompanied with different tactics of resistance, 
like direct actions, media, and legal or formal channels. The different combinations of 
tactics of resistance and modes of resistance as well as the reasons behind resistance, 
which constitute the motive for resistance, play a role in the success of resistance. 
However, the outcomes of resistance to privatization are actually outcomes of both the 
resistance that failed and the resistance that succeeded since even the failing resistance 
constitutes pressure and threat for what may possibly happen.  
At last, it is important to know that sometimes resistance fails to draw the targeted 
outcomes and instead draw reversed outcomes. At James Scott’s Weapons of the Weak, 
Scott stresses on the effect of resistance on the state. Resistance can actually lead to an 
increase in the power of the ruling group that are basically being resisted because it 
pushes the ruling group to take fierce and harsh actions, which adds to the state’s 
hegemonic power
170
. Hence, for Scott, resistance is a “mixed blessing” that bears risks as 
well as benefits to the agents of resistance.  
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CHAPTER III  
THE FIRST CASE STUDY:  
THE DELTA FOR FERTILISERS  
 
Introduction 
The decision to privatize a company is quite important to the workers in such 
company. As the chief engineer of the public chemical holding company, Azza 
Abulfarag, states, “the privatization decision itself irritates workers. They do not consider 
the future benefits for them or for their company. They are afraid of change”. They do not 
guarantee that this change will be in their interest. 
This chapter investigates the reactions of the workers in the Delta for Fertilisers 
Company when they heard that their company is going to be privatized. The chapter 
explains firstly the reasons behind the workers resistance. Such reasons reflect different 
kinds of exploitation and exclusion, which according to Tironi justify resistance. The 
more these reasons are numerous and influential, the more intensive and strong is the 
resistance.  
The chapter also reviews the tactics that the workers used in order to make their 
resistance effective. Such tactics vary between media and legal and formal channels. The 
choice of the two tactics was affected by some factors, which are mentioned in the 
chapter. 
Finally, the chapter explains the modes of resistance that the case of the Delta for 
Fertilisers represents. It represents collective mode of resistance, local mode of 
resistance, public mode of resistance, etc… 
 
 74 
 
Background about the Delta f or Fertilisers 
The Delta for fertilisers was established in 1991 under Law no. 203 of public 
enterprises. Before that time, the Delta was part of the Nasr Company for fertilisers and 
chemical products. The Nasr Company actually included two factories; one is the Suez 
factory and the other is Talkha factory, which was called later the “Delta factory for 
fertilisers and chemical productions”171.  
The factory has been innovative and successful even before 1991 and since it was 
part of the Nasr Company. It produced ureic fertilisers and Nitro-ammonic fertilisers as 
well. The two kinds of fertilisers do not contain environmentally polluting substances
172
. 
In addition, the company continued renewing and modernizing ureic containers and 
boxes in order to be much effective.
173
 Moreover, a giant energy generator was placed 
under the service of the Delta factory, which maximized work efficiency and saved time. 
To many people, the company was not in need for an investor to renew it and 
make it much more effective. In 1999, the company acquired the ISO 9002 certificate
174
. 
In 2000, it acquired the ISO 9001 certificate
175
. In addition, the company started to 
produce 30 kind of solid and liquid fertilisers, which is a real international record
176
. All 
the products are environmentally friendly products. Most importantly, the company 
                                                 
171
Delta for Fertilisers and Chemical Productions Company. Brief history of the Delta for 
fertilisers (Egypt: Mansoora, 2002). 
 
172
Ibid. 
173
Ibid.  
174
Ibid. 
175
Ibid. 
176
Ibid. 
 75 
 
succeeded at increasing its capital to L.E 200 million
177
. Table 5 shows the continuous 
increase in income, equity and assets. Clearly, it was quite unreasonable to claim that this 
company needs an investor to refresh it and solve its failure because the company was 
sustainable on all levels (economically, socially, and environmentally).  
 
Table 5. Data about the Delta 
Values in LE 1000 
ITEMS 
200
0/2001 
200
1/2002 
Net Income 
372
93 
529
58 
Net Equity 
114
219 
128
553 
Total Assets 
442
437 
447
111 
 
Source: Delta for Fertilisers Fact Sheet 
 
The Reasons of Resistance to the Privatization Decision in the Delta for Fertilisers 
Mohamed Abulkheir, the employee in the Delta for fertilisers, stated, “We know 
the public sector’s principles, work requirements, and obligations while the private sector 
                                                 
177
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is very new to us. As the verse says, what we know is certainly better than what we do 
not know” (Annex 8). 
Part of the problem in the Egyptian society and many other societies is the fear of 
change. Workers always prefer what they know on what they do not know although 
change may bring them more privileges. Once they are used to certain principles, work 
requirement, and obligations, they are not willing to change them. They even think it is 
immoral to change them since they joined the company or the organization knowing that 
it has certain nature. 
In addition to their resistance to change in itself, the workers in the Delta for 
fertilisers resist privatization for other reasons. Such reasons can be dealt with separately 
or as a part of “Change” because this “Change”, to them, brings all the negative factors 
that stimulate resistance. According to the employees in the Delta and their 
representatives in the labor syndicate, privatization has many negatives or side effects. 
All such negatives reflect the possible exploitation or exclusion that can happen to the 
workers. According to Tironi’s theory of resistance, this exploitation or exclusion leads to 
resistance.   
When the employees in the Delta felt they are going to be excluded and exploited 
(as will be explained in details in this chapter), they started to resist. All their reasons of 
resistance were related to a type or another of exclusion or exploitation. Although the 
workers have not really passed through all this exclusion or exploitation themselves, they 
expected certain things to happen. As they say in the questionnaire, they learned of the 
past experiences of privatization. They heard of what happened in nearby companies, 
such as Coca-Cola, Misr for Construction Company, Misr for artificial gases in Musterd, 
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the 10
th
 of Ramadan Cables Company, Alexandria Detro-chemicals Company, and Misr 
for Chemicals Company. 
From the face-to-face questionnaire that was conducted with the Delta employees, 
it was found that their reasons of resistance were derived from the past experiences of 
privatization. In addition, they were derived from their own experience with privatization, 
which reflects their exploitation and exclusion (annex 8). In general, their reasons of 
resistance are: 
1) Unjust dismissals:  
Many employees were unjustly dismissed after these companies were privatized. 
This actually happened in many companies nearby the Delta for fertilisers. Investors were 
only concerned with their own interest. They pursued profit, which required minimizing 
cost and maximizing returns. In order to minimize costs, the investors dismissed many 
workers. They twisted the laws in order to achieve their interests. In the words of Mr. 
Nabeeh Shafik Shabana, the member in the general syndicate for chemicals and the 
member in the top management of the syndicate commission in the Delta for Fertilisers: 
The investor can go around the laws. According to law, if the employee is 
employed in three positions in the same workplace and his work performance was 
feeble in the three positions, it is legal to dismiss him. Simply, the investor can go 
around the law and put the employee in three areas that he is not used to or 
eligible to perform, and then dismisses him. According to the old law, if the 
employee complains he can bring his case in front of a three-members committee. 
According to the new law (Law no.12 for the Year 2003), he can bring it in front 
of a five-members committee. However, the two laws can not bring the employee 
back to his job. Even the court can not bring the employee back to his job. With 
some luck, the court will ask for compensations equivalent to the employee’s 
salary for number of years. However, the compensations are calculated according 
to the nominal employee’s salary and not the real one that includes promotions 
and privileges. Thus, dismissal is unjust to workers. I do not name it dismissal; I 
name it ‘Butchery’ (annex 9). 
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Although, dismissing employees has to go through certain procedures that 
organize and bound dismissal, employees can still be dismissed unjustly. Neither the 
Egyptian law nor the Egyptian court system is able of bringing the worker back to his job 
against the will of his employer. The employer can put any of his employees in three jobs 
that he is not eligible to and then dismisses him because he is not competent. The three-
members committee or the five-members committee will find this legal; however, it is 
immoral. On the other hand, if the employee referred his case to the court, he will be 
compensated unfairly because the court will miscalculate the employee’s salary upon 
which the compensation is defined. 
Thus, the employees in the Delta for fertilisers were afraid of being dismissed 
after the privatization of their company. They did not trust the investor, the Egyptian law, 
or the Egyptian court system. They were afraid of being dismissed and in the light of the 
high unemployment rate and the scarce fertilisers companies, they would not have found 
any job. 
2) Early retirement:  
In order for the investor to minimize his costs, he uses the early retirement policy 
to deal with the overstaffed departments. He pays an amount of money at the beginning 
in order not to pay anything afterwards. However, the face-to-face questionnaire with the 
Delta employees shows the workers’ awareness that these sums of money are usually 
spent on unproductive and mostly consumptive things. They are spent on the daughters’ 
marriage, houses’ renewal, second marriage, etc... 
Although early retirement is optional, Workers in the Delta for fertilisers were 
aware that they can be forced to accept it and even ask for it. The head of the syndicate 
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commission in the Delta for fertilisers, Mr. Reyad Tolba stated that troubles and 
problems in the workplace push the workers to ask for early retirement although in 
another environment they would not have asked for it. He also stated that reducing wages 
or promotions also force workers to retire as they find their efforts unappreciated.  
 Early retirement leads to workers’ exclusion and exploitation in many senses. It 
excludes some workers from the work and production arena. In addition, on the long run, 
it exploits them because they start to have no regular source of income since they usually 
spend their money on consumptive and unproductive items. Thus, early retirement 
worsens the people’s economic and social position.  
3) Unemployment:  
On the macro level, privatizing the Delta for fertilisers Company would have 
increased the unemployment rate. Bearing in mind the fact that most of the workers 
spend the amounts of money they acquire on consumptive items as stated above, the 
logical consequence of workers’ dismissal and early retirement would have been an 
increase of unemployment.  
Unemployment, in turn, leads to other problems. It leads to instability and social 
violence. It also increases the crimes’ rate and sparks the social problems. Unemployment 
can also increase the rate of poverty. In addition, it creates gab between the employed and 
the unemployed, which raises inequality. This gab gets wider because the unemployed is 
increasingly excluded from the social and economic arena for his deteriorated family and 
financial status. 
4) Reduction in wages and promotions: 
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Reducing wages and promotions is another way to reduce costs. This constituted a 
real fear to the workers in the Delta. There was a unanimous agreement between the 
workers of the Delta that if they remained in the company after its privatization, they 
would suffer wages’ reductions because the investor would like to minimize his costs and 
maximize his returns. In addition, they believed that their promotions and privileges 
would be reduced. In all cases, they would not be able to do anything since they can not 
afford to lose their jobs. The existence of very few number of fertilisers’ companies could 
make the workers submit to the unjust rules of the investor in order not to lose their jobs.  
If dismissal and early retirement leads to the exclusion of the workers who leave 
their company, reducing wages and promotions leads to the exploitation of the workers 
who remain in the company. Reducing wages and promotions exploits workers in the 
sense that it deprives them from receiving incomes equivalent to their counterparts in 
other companies. Although they stay the same number of hours (if not more) and exert 
the same effort, they will not enjoy the same wages or promotions. 
5) Minimization of social securities: 
Another way to reduce costs and get red of the social burden on the investor’s 
shoulders is minimizing social securities. Most of the workers in the Delta are aware of 
the possibility of losing their social securities if their company was sold to a private 
investor. It is the same idea of “Investors pursuing profit and seeking their self-interest”. 
Minimizing social securities involves another degree of workers’ exclusion and 
exploitation. It excludes workers from a service that they had been part of for a long time. 
It also exploits workers in the sense that the workers’ efforts are taken without giving 
workers health care, pensions, and social services in return. The problem is much bigger 
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when the workers’ jobs are dangerous or involve a high degree of risk. Jobs that directly 
deal with chemicals, like the jobs in the Delta for fertilisers, are risky jobs that require 
high degree of health care. Thus, minimizing social and health securities was a strong 
reason for the workers in the Delta to resist privatization.  
 
 
6) More Working hours: 
 It represents the other side of the coin. If all the previous reasons reflect the 
investor’s attempt to reduce costs, this factor reflects the investor’s attempt to increase his 
returns. It is deeply rooted in the minds of all the interviewed workers of the Delta that 
the investor will make them work for more working hours.  
7) Control of prices:  
Another way to increase returns is to raise prices. The investor may raise prices in 
order to gain more profits. He does not consider the fact that he is dealing with a sensitive 
products that poor and simple farmers use in their daily life. As Soliman Mohamed 
Soliman, the head of the medical department in the Delta for fertilisers, states, “Raising 
pricing in a company like ours is very dangerous because our products are very important 
products that go to the poor people. Raising prices means that farmers will not be able to 
buy fertilisers to their lands. This will subsequently lead to raising the prices of all the 
agricultural crops” (annex 8). 
8) Monopoly of Urea:  
The investor who was going to buy the Delta for fertilisers was the owner of Abu-
Keer for fertilisers, which is the only producer of urea after the Delta. This meant that 
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Abu Keer would monopolize the production and manufacture of urea. The employees of 
the Delta for Fertilisers and their representatives in the labor syndicate were quite aware 
of this. They are also aware (as clear in the questioner) that there is no law in Egypt that 
prohibits or organizes monopolies.  
The problem was dangerous because, as stated above, the Delta products are 
products that serve the farmers. They are high quality products that are sold in very low 
prices. Monopolizing urea production would have given the investor the chance to 
control the quantity and quality of the fertilisers. He could have reduced quantity and 
quality of the urea. In addition, he could have raised its prices. This would have harmed 
all the products that need urea in general and the fertilisers products in specific. In turn, 
this would have harmed farmers severely and affected their agriculture in quantity, 
quality, and price.  
9) Not working for the country:  
Working for the public sector makes workers more willing to give. It is their 
sense of loyalty and belonging to their country and their company that push them to work 
harder. As most of the workers in the Delta for fertilisers stated, “We feel we work for 
our company and our country. In all cases, the benefit goes to us, to our families, and to 
our children”. Moreover, the workers unanimously agreed that they feel much safer when 
they work for their countries. They realized they would not be unjustly dismissed. In 
addition, their salaries, promotions, and social securities would not be minimized. 
Working for the country is a psychological factor more than any thing else. The 
workers feel exploited when they work for an investor, especially if he is foreign. They 
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even misjudge every action taken by the investor. In addition, they feel their country’s 
surplus is exploited since a private investor owns the company and enjoy its profit. 
10) Bad company assessment: 
The bad assessment of the Delta for fertilisers Company is well understood in the 
words of Mr. Tolba and Mr. Khalaf. Mr. Reyad Tolba, the head of the syndicate 
commission in the Delta for fertilisers, stated:  
Our experience in the Delta revealed that the company was going to be 
sold in a very low price based on a bad assessment. The assessment was old and 
made 5 years before the date of the selling. In addition, the assessment was made 
in a time where the dollar exchange rate in Egyptian pounds was different and far 
below its value at the time of the sale. Five years ago, the dollar was equivalent to 
330 piaster. At the time of the sale, the dollar’s value increased to 465 piaster. 
Hence, the company was going to be sold with quarter its real value (see annex 9).  
 
In the words of Abdel-Aziz Khalaf, the general manager in cars and buses’ 
operation and maintenance in the Delta Company, “The assessment of the company’s 
value was wrong and it extremely undermined the value if the company. It counted for 
25% of the real value of the company though the price of the land or the city that exists 
within the land is more than the price that was offered to the company” (annex 8). 
11) The imposition of privatization: 
As stated in the previous chapters, privatization as derived by donor countries and 
agencies is a reason for resistance to many people. However, since only highly educated 
and aware citizens know this piece of information, resisting privatization for this reason 
is limited to few people. The imposition of privatization from outside was an irritating 
point to the Delta representatives in the labor syndicate. They had high educational and 
awareness level. They knew that the privatization program is imposed on Egypt from 
outside, which raised their antagonism. Nabeeh shabana, the representative of the labor 
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syndicate in the Delta for fertilisers, stated, “We all know this privatization is imposed on 
us from abroad, it is not the sincere wish of the people or the government. It is 
compliance to the global trends and external pressures” (annex9). They felt their country 
itself is excluded from decision-making. In addition, they realized that the country’s 
resources and successful enterprises were exploited in this process.  
 
 
The Tactics of Resistance 
The employees of the Delta for fertilisers deployed many resistance tactics. As the 
privatization assessment expert in the Ministry of Investment states, “There is a very 
important triangle that when all its corners are reached, any decision to privatize a public 
enterprise can be cancelled or changed. The three corners of the triangle, which are 
media, parliament, and workers’ activism, exist in the case of the Delta for fertilisers” 
(annex 6). 
The assessment expert spoke of a very important triangle of resistance. The 
triangle of resistance that the privatization assessment expert described is the one in 
Figure 4. Each corner holds a strategy or tactic of resistance. The first corner is labor 
activism, which reflects the workers’ collective determination to resist. The second 
corner is the media and press. The third corner is what he calls Parliament and I have 
included under formal channels. 
Labor activism 
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                                       Media                                       formal channels 
 
Figure 4. The triangle of resistance 
 
The first corner is labor activism. The workers in the Delta for fertilisers were 
very determined to resist the decision to privatize their company. They all decided to 
meet with their representatives in the labor syndicate and discuss the possible ways to 
fight the privatization decision together.  
However, the labor activism in the Delta did not reach the level of direct actions. 
They were quite aware that the Egyptian laws restrict and put conditions to assembling. 
This awareness was the product of their personal knowledge as well as the attempts by 
their representatives in the labor union and labor syndicate to inform them about the best 
ways and most influential ones to fight privatization. Upon such information, the workers 
and the labor union representatives decided not to resort to strikes or demonstrations. 
They realized it requires many legal steps to start a demonstration or a strike, like 
informing authorities and certain governmental institutions of the date and place of 
assembly. This would have allowed the government and the police forces to intervene 
and spoil their efforts. 
One of the tactics that the employees in the Delta preferred to use is media and 
press. The media and the press represent the second corner in the resistance triangle. The 
Delta representatives in the labor union contacted many newspapers and asked them for 
help. They sent to many newspapers a request to intervene and help them. The request 
was coupled with a document that shows the different kinds of exploitation and exclusion 
that result from the decision of privatizing the Delta for Fertilisers Company. 
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Attached to this research the document they sent to the newspapers (annex 11). 
The document spells out certain facts. The first fact is the success of the company in 
fertilisers’ production, marketing, and selling. The company succeeded at making a place 
for it in the international market. It succeeded at selling L.E 67 million products to 
America. The net profit in 2000/2001 was L.E 46 million.  
The second fact is related to the number of employees in the Delta. The company 
contains 4700 employees. This means that 25000 individuals (workers and their families) 
are socially and psychologically dependent on the company. The workers and their 
families have a stable source of income. In addition, they enjoy free health care and other 
social securities.  
The third fact is the company’s provision of quite important products to the 
Egyptian farmers. The products are quite essential to the farmers and their agriculture, 
which makes their price and quality central to the farmers’ lives and livings. The Delta 
provides such products in low prices and high quality since it sells the fertilisers by 55 
pound per ton and makes sure they contain high quality substances that compete with 
foreign ones. 
The fourth fact is the underestimating and bad assessment of the company. The 
value of the company is much higher than the price it was going to be sold with. In 
addition, this low price is based on the 1999 assessment, which is a very old assessment. 
At that time, the dollar was equivalent to 330 piaster. It is illogical to sell the company 
three years later with the same assessment whereas the dollar’s value increased to 465 
piaster.  
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After spelling out the four facts, the document questioned the sale of the 
company. It questioned the sale of a very successful company that employs a big number 
of employees and produces strategic products. Such products should not be left totally to 
the private sector to control their prices, quantity and quality. 
The labor syndicate representatives sent this document to many newspapers. They 
sent it to the Republic or ‘Gimhoriah’ newspaper, the Arab newspaper, the independents 
or ‘Alahrar’ newspaper, Alahram newspaper, Almidan newspaper, and Almesaa 
newspaper. In return, these newspapers aroused the issue and made it a public opinion 
matter. They continuously deliberated the issue of privatizing using all the information 
available in the document. 
The newspapers succeeded at revealing all the issues about privatizing the Delta 
for fertilisers. They revealed the issue of the bad assessment and the low price the 
company was going to be sold with. In addition, they revealed the importance of the 
company and the strategic products it produces. They also uncovered the attempts to 
monopolize urea production and manufacture. At last, they questioned the strange and 
skeptic deal of selling such a successful company that provides a stable income to a lot of 
people. 
The third corner in the resistance triangle is the parliament or the formal channels. 
Reaching the members of the parliament (MPs) is one of the formal ways to fight 
privatization. The Delta labor syndicate representatives contacted the Dakahlia 
representatives in the people’s assembly (the parliament). They gave them the same 
document given to the newspapers. They were quite aware that those representatives are 
 88 
 
chosen to represent them and represent their demands as citizens of their district. They 
asked them to arouse the issue in the people’s assembly. 
In addition, the Delta labor syndicate representatives and a group of the Delta 
workers distributed a petition on all the MPs in the parliament. The petition was a brief 
memo of the document they gave to the newspapers. The opposition members 
specifically found it an interesting topic to arouse and discuss. Clearly, the Delta 
employees knew how to ask for their rights through formal channels instead of resorting 
to violence or direct actions. 
The employees of the Delta for fertilisers effectively deployed the three corners of 
the resistance triangle. The resistance of the Delta workers was very organized on the 
three levels. In the words of the privatization assessment expert who represents the 
standpoint of decision makers, he stated, 
The three corners, which are media, parliament, and workers activism, 
were all intelligently deployed in the case of the Delta for fertilisers. The Delta 
workers were very active spreading their case everywhere. They aroused their 
case in the newspapers, whether opposition newspapers or national ones. In 
addition, they reached their members of parliament who aroused their case in the 
parliament. They even went to the parliament and distributed a petition on all the 
members of the parliament. They turned their case into a national security case 
that threatens of instability and public unrest. Thus, decision makers had to 
accommodate to the situation in order not to jeopardize national security (annex 
6).  
 
The Modes of Resistance 
The resistance of the employees in the Delta for fertilisers entails a public mode 
of resistance. It is not a political resistance because it does not refer to the resistance of 
politicians or decision makers or even top ranks employees. It is a workers’ resistance 
performed by the workers in the Delta and their representatives in the labor union.  
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The resistance of the Delta employees entails also a domestic and very local mode 
of resistance and not a global one. It is a nationally located resistance. It targets the 
national decision makers rather than the global ones. It is very local mode in the sense 
that it refers to the grassroots’ resistance. This resistance is the resistance of the people 
who do not seize concrete power or authority, who are the Delta employees in this case. 
In addition, it is not an infra politics mode of resistance. It is a clear and apparent 
mode of resistance as they worked through media and parliament. The Delta employees 
did not try to disguise their resistance or cover it. Hence, the mode of resistance deployed 
in the case of the Delta for fertilisers was public, local, and visible. However, these are 
not the only modes of resistance identified in the case of the Delta for fertilisers. 
The resistance in the Delta entails a collective mode of resistance. It is not an 
individual form of resistance. Although it did not reach the level of a movement, which is 
the highest degree of organized resistance, it is still a collective and organized form of 
resistance. It is based on solidarity between workers and each other and solidarity 
between workers and labor union representatives.  
Being highly organized maximized the benefits of the resistance tactics. The labor 
union activists played a vital role in organizing resistance in the Delta for fertilisers. They 
helped planning, preparing, and performing resistance. They guided the workers to the 
best tactics that save time and achieve target (i.e.: media and parliament). They planned 
and prepared for reaching media and parliament members very well. In addition, they 
took part in the resistance through writing and sending an important document to the 
media, press, and their representatives in the parliament. They also wrote the petition and 
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distributed it on the members of parliament. Obviously, their activism was central to the 
success of the resistance of the employees in the Delta for fertilisers. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The resistance of the employees in the Delta for fertilisers was a very strong 
resistance. In response to the resistance of the Delta employees, all the offers to buy the 
company were refused. In addition, the head of the chemical public enterprises blocked 
the efforts to privatize the company because his reputation was at stake. The privatization 
expert assessment stated, “the workers accused him of selling a successful company that 
earns profits for his personal interest. Thus, he submitted a memo at which he asked to 
cancel the privatization decision because it started to be an issue that touches his dignity 
and honor” (annex 6). Although it was a local resistance, it succeeded at changing the 
state plans to privatize the company. Obviously, the workers’ resistance changed the 
national agenda. 
At last, the too many highly intensified reasons for resistance gave the workers in 
the Delta a strong motive to actively resist the privatization decision. The deployed 
tactics of resistance were intelligent enough to address the Parliament or the formal 
channels and arouse public opinion (through media) as well. In addition, the well-
organized visible and clear mode of resistance played a strong role in the success of the 
resistance. The three factors helped shaping the resistance to privatization in the Delta for 
fertilisers.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THR SECOND CASE STUDY:  
THE CASE OF CEMEX 
 
Introduction 
This chapter investigates the reactions of the workers in Asiut Cement Company 
when they heard that their company is going to be privatized. The chapter starts with an 
introduction about the two companies, Asiut Cement Company and Cemex. Then, the 
chapter explains the reasons behind the workers’ resistance. The less the number and 
influence of these reasons are, the weaker the resistance is.  
The chapter also reviews the tactics that they used in order to make their 
resistance effective and the factors that affected their choice of the tactics. They could 
have chosen between one or more of the resistance tactics (media, direct actions, and 
legal or formal channels). They actually utilized one tactic, which referred to direct 
actions.  
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Finally, the chapter explains the modes of resistance that Cemex represents. This 
means it may represent collective or non-collective mode of resistance, global or 
domestic mode of resistance, political or public mode of resistance, etc… 
 
The Privatization of Asiut Cement Company 
Asiut Cement Company is one of nine Egyptian Cement Companies that exist in 
Egypt. Before the privatization plans of the government, eight companies out of the nine 
were owned by the Egyptian public sector
178
. However, the eight cement companies came 
among the 314 firms slated for divesture under law 203
179
. 
The decision to privatize Asiut Cement Company along with the seven other 
cement companies was due to many things. The demand of cement was outstandingly 
rising in Egypt while the supply of cement was not rising with the same rate. The national 
production of cement was actually falling. The demand was rising due to the 
“infrastructure demands for the mega-projects being undertaken by the government as 
well as growth in construction activities in the private sector”180. Thus, while the 
consumption of cement was 25 million tons in 1998 and increased to 34 million tons in 
1999, the national production of cement was only 21 millions tons
181
. This led to the 
import of millions of tons of cement, which was unacceptable solution to the Egyptian 
government. 
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In order for the government to solve the problem of low cement production, it 
decided to sell the eight public cement companies. This should bring new administrations 
and new work principles based on competition and efficiency to the workplaces. Hence, 
although cement industry is flourishing and is profitable in Egypt since it enjoys low 
operating costs
182
, cement companies were slated for divesture. In 1999, Asiut Cement 
Company was sold to the private sector. 
Background about Cemex Company 
Cemex is a Mexican international worldwide Company. The merger of two 
Mexican companies, Cementos Hidalgo and Cementos Portland Monterrey, in 1931 
created Cementos Mexicanos or Cemex. It is one of three largest cement companies in 
the world
183
. It has branches in more than 30 countries around the world
184
. It is also 
responsible of producing, distributing, marketing, and selling cement. 
In November 1999, Cemex took over Asiut Company. At the beginning, it 
acquired 77% of Asiut Cement Company
185
. In June 2000, it acquired 13% more of the 
Company and by January 2001, they acquired 5.8% more of the company
186
. The 
remaining 4.2% of the company was left to the Employees Shareholder Association 
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(ESA). However, the employees were unable of paying the installments: thus, their share 
was returned back to the holding company
187
. 
Cemex has been in control of the company for five years now. In these five years, 
capital injection has increased, the management of the company has improved, and the 
production was boosted
188
. In addition, Cemex “increased efficiency, promoted 
environmental soundness, opened new local and export markets, and attracted hundreds 
of new clients”189.  
Cemex has succeeded at maximizing the company’s sale of Cement. It has 
upgraded some lines of production and is currently upgrading three more lines of 
production
190
. This helped building a new commercial structure that reaches all parts of 
Egypt. It also raised the company’s customer base from 80 before privatization to 800 
after privatization
191
. With all its achievements, Cemex did not jeopardize the 
environmental safety. On contrary, it succeeded at “reducing bypass dust emission levels 
to 120-180 mg/m3 from 900 mg/m3. It also succeeded at reducing suspended dust inside 
plant from 20 mg/m3 to 5 mg/m3”192. 
 
The Reasons of Resistance to Privatization in Cemex 
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A face-to-face questionnaire was conducted with the employees in Cemex. 
However, it was limited to the employees who were initially working in the factory since 
it was a pubic ownership (before it was privatized). The face to face questionnaire 
attempted to reveal some of the factors that irritated the workers in Asiut Cement when 
they knew their company is going to be privatized. Such factors are: 
1) The fear of losing jobs through dismissal or early retirement: 
The face-to-face questionnaire revealed a unanimous fear among the workers of 
being dismissed or forced to early retire. They were afraid that the investor would release 
a big number of employees especially that their company was overstaffed in 
administration and in fieldwork. The only option in front of the investor would be 
releasing as much employees as possible. 
However, a high degree of awareness existed among the workers. They were 
aware that only inefficient workers and uncompetitive ones would be dismissed or forced 
to early retire. Thus, most of the workers in the interviews combined their statements 
about their fear of dismissal with a sentence stating “However, I was not worried because 
I am an efficient employee and my record is excellent” (annex 10). Although many 
employees were afraid of being dismissed or forced to early retire, it was not a strong 
reason behind resistance for all of them since many employees trusted their abilities and 
their excellent records. 
2) The fear of losing privileges and social securities: 
The employees in the company were also afraid of losing their privileges and 
social security. The employees in Asiut Cement Company used to enjoy health care 
covering half their families for free. In addition, they were all members in Asiut Cement 
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club. They also enjoyed other privileges. Thus, they were afraid of losing them or their 
social securities if the investor attempted to minimize his costs. 
3) The fear of low promotions and reduced wages: 
The greatest fear of the employees who would stay in the company after its 
privatization was having their wages and promotions reduced. They were afraid that the 
investor while trying to minimize his costs and maximizing his profit would reduce their 
salaries and promotions. They knew they would not afford to quit their jobs (since other 
cement companies exist in far distance villages and placed) and in this case, they would 
continue working in the company however feeling very marginalized and exploited. 
4) Working for a foreign investor instead of working for the country: 
Some of the employees were afraid of working in a private company. Their sense 
of insecurity and non-safety increased. Huwaida Abdelgaber, the accountant in the 
financial department in Cemex, stated, “We were angry because we felt that a part of us 
and a part of our country is being sold. It really differs when the one works for his/her 
country and when he/she works for a foreign investor. Transferring the ownership of our 
company to a single investor meant that some one would be controlling us, which made 
us feel some how unsecured and unsafe. He could dismiss us or manipulate our wages or 
working hours. All the profit at last would go to him instead of going to our country” 
(annex 10). 
5) The company has been successful and there is no need to privatize it:  
The employees in Asiut Cement Company were surprised of the privatization of 
their company because it was not a loss making enterprise. Most of the employees in 
Asiut Cement Company stated, “We were astonished to know that our company is going 
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to be sold although it was very successful and thus should not be put to sale” (annex 10). 
They were also afraid that the investor would not keep the company at the same level 
especially that the company was very successful and used to earn high profit. 
The face-to-face questionnaire conducted with Cemex employees revealed that 
the employees and the workers in Cemex were not quite provoked and irritated by the 
privatization decision, unlike the Workers in the Delta for fertilisers, for two reasons. The 
first reason is related to the previous or past experiences in selling cement companies. 
The second reason is related to the preliminary steps that the foreign investor took. Such 
steps helped at relieving the workers in Cemex. The questionnaire proved that the two 
factors really helped removing the tension between the employees and the investor. They 
decreased the intensity of the reasons of resistance. 
1) The previous experiences in selling cement companies: 
If the past experiences in the case of the Delta for fertilisers aroused the fear of 
the workers in the Delta, the case of Cemex was quite different. Past experiences in 
selling cement companies suggested the success of their privatization experience (except 
Helwan Cement). Mr. Badra Mustafa, who was working in Asiut Cement before it was 
privatized and is currently the head of the human resources department in Cemex, stated 
that privatized cement companies succeeded at raising the incomes of their employees 
(annex 10). He continued to say that the employees’ salaries in these companies became 
equal to the employees in the private sector, which is a great shift for the public sector 
employees. However their privileges did not decrease; instead, the previous experiences 
of privatized cement companies suggested that they increased. Furthermore, the 
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efficiency and the rate of production increased. Examples to such successful privatized 
cement companies are the Suez Cement Company and Alexandria Cement Company.  
While in the case of the Delta for fertilisers the bad experiences of privatization, 
which the employees heard of, aggravated their resistance, the good experiences of 
privatization that the employees in Cemex heard of had a different impact. Such good 
experiences made the workers of Asiut Cement hesitate thousand times before thinking in 
resistance. Thus, resistance was not the first thing that came to the employees’ minds 
when they knew their company was going to be privatized unlike what happened in the 
case of the Delta. 
2) The encouraging preliminary steps taken by the investor: 
The package that the investor approved and signed was the first act of good 
intentions provided by the foreign investor. In the package, the investor approved to keep 
the employees’ social securities and also approved not to reduce their salaries. This 
actually destroyed some of the employees’ fears to lose their social securities or have 
their salaries reduced. 
The package also included the early retirement scheme of payments. This was the 
real surprise in the selling deal. The investor provided high amounts of money to the 
employees in return to their retirement. The sums of money were the double and the triple 
of the amounts of money approved by the government.  
When the list of the sums of money planned to be paid for early retirement was 
shown to the Asiut Cement employees, the employees were pleased and relieved. As Mr. 
Badra Mustafa stated: 
The early retirement sums of money ranged between 90,000 pound and 
150,000 pound for workers and in cases of high rank employees and senior 
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managers, it reached 250,000 pound. No employee has ever held such sums of 
money. Workers and employees found themselves not only able to work 
separately and own their own jobs, but rather, able to own their own ‘companies’. 
Two of our employees actually took their early retirement payments and bough 
the buses of the Asiut Cement Company. They their own business: their own 
Company (annex 10). 
 
The package actually provided the retired employees with direct compensation 
scheme, which directly compensate the losers or the victims of the reform
193
. The overall 
amount of money that Cemex spent on the early retirement program was more than $50 
million
194
. The number of employees was thus reduced from 3,774 employees to 1,161 
employees
195
.  
Such a package was more than enough to prove the good intentions of the 
investor. Most of the employees decided to wait and see what this investor and his new 
company were going to do. Especially that the previous experiences of privatizing 
cement companies were promising, the idea of resistance was not widely accepted 
between Asiut Cement employees. 
 
The Tactics of Resistance 
The tactics of resistance that were deployed in the case of Cemex were very few, 
limited, and weak. They reflected the employees’ hesitance to resist. The workers in 
Cemex performed two strikes or demonstrations when they knew their company was 
going to be privatized. They were actually motivated by the workers fear to lose their 
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jobs. However, the first demonstration lasted for few hours and was not heard outside the 
zone of the cement company. As Mr. Badra stated: 
Only few interruptions happened when the worker knew of the 
privatization decision. For instance, 200 workers made a demonstration 
demanding the investor not to dismiss a certain employee. It was their fear of the 
wave of dismissals that pushed them to make this demonstration. It was a weak 
demonstration and lasted for two hours only (annex 10). 
 
Another employee in Cemex spoke about the other strike. He stated, “There has 
been a strike by less than a thousand workers who were very afraid of being forced to 
early retire. However, after they knew of the sums of money they were going to take, 
they were very satisfied” (annex 10). The compensation scheme played role in 
comforting the resistance to the new investor.  
However, an important reason behind the weakness and limitation of the workers’ 
resistance is the fact that their representatives in the labor union were not real activists. 
They did not cooperate with the employees or advise them with a specific tactic. 
Normally, the workers’ strikes came out unorganized and again lasted for few hours since 
their labor union representatives, who were supposed to plan, organize, and help in 
performing the resistance, did not collaborate with the workers .   
Not having collaboration between the workers and the labor union representatives 
also led to the deployment of a single tactic. The workers deployed direct actions and left 
other tactics such as media and legal or formal channels although such tactics spread and 
legalize their case more than direct actions. Obviously, they did not find any one that can 
guide them or direct their efforts and resources to a better tactic. 
However, the responsibility does not all fall on the labor union and labor 
syndicate representatives. It also falls on the workers and the employees in Asiut Cement. 
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Although they had knowledge about privatization (its side effects, its positive sides, 
whom it will harm mostly, etc…), they were not aware of the possibility of fighting it. 
Most of the workers in the face-to-face questionnaire stated, “We knew it was a 
presidential decree, which meant it was impossible to change it” (annex 10). Thus, many 
workers had limited knowledge of the ways to reach decision makers and change 
agendas. Their statement might also reflect a tone of despair of the current regime, as 
they think there is no hope to change presidential or governmental decisions. 
 
The Modes of Resistance 
The mode of resistance deployed in the case of Cemex is a public mode of 
resistance. It was not performed by politicians, decision makers, or people who acquired 
power or authority. Rather, it was purely and solely performed by the workers in the 
Asiut cement factory. 
The mode of resistance is also domestic very local mode of resistance. It was 
performed on the local level and not the global one. It was a nationally located resistance 
performed by simple ordinary workers. Such workers did not think of targeting the 
international decision makers; instead, they targeted the decision makers inside their 
company since their strikes or demonstrations were actually addressing them. They did 
not target the global decision makers or the decision makers on the state level. They were 
narrow-minded in the sense that they thought it was impossible for national decision 
makers to change their decisions. 
The resistance of the employees in Cemex was a mixture of infrapolitics and 
explicit modes of resistance. It was explicit in the sense that it took the form of direct 
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actions, which were visible and publicly performed. However, it also took the form of 
infrapolitics since the employees there were discussing the issue every day and discussing 
its side effects however, without taking any action. They all decided to “wait and see” 
(annex 10). 
In addition, the resistance in Cemex was not organized. The labor union and their 
representatives who usually give resistance the sense of organization and planning did not 
exist. As Tarrow states, “collective action is a resource that social movement organizers 
use in place”196 Thus, Cemex resistance lost a vital factor in their resistance. If such 
factor had exited, resistance tactics would have increased and have become more 
efficient. In addition, organization and collaboration between workers and each other 
would have increased and between workers and labor union activists would also have 
increased.  
To conclude, the modes of resistance in the case of Asiut Cement were public, 
domestic or local, and mixture of visible and infrapolitics resistance. However, most 
importantly, it was not very collective or professionally organized. Rather, it was based 
individualism, which reflected each individual’s fears and his personal reactions to such 
fears.  
 
Conclusion 
The reasons behind the employees’ resistance in Asiut Cement were not quite 
important in number or in influence. They were only five reasons. In addition, those 
reasons were coupled with high workers’ awareness to the fact that only unproductive 
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and poor record employees are the ones that would be mostly injured with the 
privatization decision. This minimized the effect of the first three reasons of resistance. 
The rest of the reasons were weakened with the emergence of the compensation scheme 
and the package that the investor approved.  
The resistance of the employees in Asuit cement was weakened due to other 
factors. Firstly, it was unorganized resistance because the activists who were supposed to 
guide and organize resistance as well as increase the awareness of the workers were not 
did not do their job. In addition, the resistance was not explicit and visible all the way. It 
was actually silent most of the times. Moreover, although the resistance was a local 
resistance, it did not target the national decision makers on the state level. They were not 
aware enough that they could pressure decision makers to change their decisions. Thus, 
they only addressed the decision makers inside their country who practically can not take 
the decision of canceling privatization. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
This chapter concludes the implications of the workers’ resistance in each case, 
the Delta and Asiut Cement, on privatization. Each case bears different reasons of 
resistance, tactics of reactance, and modes of resistance on privatization. The research 
seeks to know the implications of all this on the track of privatization for each company. 
Resistance to privatization in the case of the Delta was different to the one in the 
case of Cemex. The workers’ resistance to the privatization decision of their company 
was quite strong and intensified in the case of the delta. On the other hand, it was weak 
and limited in the case of Cemex. The difference between the two depends on each case‘s 
reasons of resistance, tactics of resistance, and modes of resistance. 
 
Summary of Findings 
The reasons of resistance in each case determined and constituted the motive for 
each agent of resistance to resist. Thus, the stronger the reasons of resistance were, the 
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more intensified and determined the resistance was. In the case of the Delta, there were 
many reasons for resistance. Such reasons of resistance were backed with many previous 
experiences that showed the impact of privatization in exploiting and excluding 
employees. On the other hand, the employees in Cemex did not have the same reasons for 
resistance. They had fewer reasons for resistance. In addition, the previous experiences in 
privatizing cement companies encouraged them to wait instead of resisting. In addition, 
the investor in the case of Cemex offered a package that proved his good intentions 
unlike the investor in the Delta case who was going to monopolize Urea. 
The tactics of resistance also play an essential role in shaping the impact of 
resistance. The use of one tactic of resistance limits the effect of resistance. In the case of 
Cemex, only direct actions were deployed. By deploying one tactic, the workers limited 
the effect of resistance to a large extent because the resistance was not accompanied with 
media or press that could turn their case to a public opinion case. In addition, it was not 
accompanied with the use of legal or formal channels that could have legalized their 
position and directly connected them with national decision makers. On the contrary to 
Cemex, the workers in the case of the Delta deployed the three tactics, which made their 
case spread and reach people as well as national decision makers. 
At last, the mode of resistance also shapes the impact of resistance on 
privatization. Although in Cemex and Delta the modes of resistance were some how 
similar, the few differences between the two were fatal. Both of them entailed public, 
local, and clear or visible modes of resistance. However, the Delta case presented an 
organized mode of resistance that depended on the labor union and labor syndicate to 
organize, prepare, and plan the tactics of resistance while Cemex did not. In the case of 
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Cemex, the resistance was much individualistic and the choice of their tactic of resistance 
came purely from the minds of the workers, who did not find some one to guide them.  
The difference between the two modes of resistance is obvious in Tarrow’s 
analysis of the repertoires of resistance. He hypotheses the repertoire of protest in a circle 
that increases and then declines after the use of the disruptive actions. On the other hand, 
he hypotheses the repertoire of a much organized resistance in a circle that proceed and 
the collective action starts to be diffused on public and then starts to shrink once the 
demands are met. The difference is clear, at the first repertoire, which refers to the case of 
Cemex, the collective action is not diffused on public and the demands are not 
necessarily met in order for the cycle to decrease. At the second repertoire, which refers 
to the case of the Delta, the collective action is diffused and the demands are met in order 
for the cycle to decrease.  
Moreover, the modes of resistance represented in the Delta for fertilisers and 
Cemex were not the same with regard to the explicitly of resistance. While the resistance 
in the Delta for fertilisers was explicit, clear, and performed on public, the resistance in 
Cemex was not explicit all the time. Part of the workers resistance in Cemex was silent 
and was not interpreted into explicit resistance. 
At last, the two resistances were different with regard to their local mode of 
resistance. Though the two cases represented local modes of resistance and not global 
ones, the resistance of the Delta targeted the local and national decision makers (through 
media and parliament) while the resistance of Cemex targeted the decision makers inside 
their company (through direct actions). Thus, the two resistances were actually different. 
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The outcome of the two resistances is logical. The one that had stronger motive, 
depended on variety of tactics that target variety of actors, and was much organized and 
explicit in terms of modes of resistance will be much effective. Thus, the resistance of the 
employees of the Delta for fertilisers was stronger and much effective. It succeeded at 
blocking the efforts to privatize their company and also succeeded at convincing the 
decision makers to cancel the decision. 
This changed the privatization track on the micro level or on the level of the 
company. However, in future, this can have a macro level effect or a spread over effect to 
other companies. The new Egyptian ministry that was selected in 2004, out of its 
recognition of the existence of resistance and its comprehension of such resistance’s 
nature, it started a new policy that consider privatization one option from tens of other 
options and not an obligation. 
Finally, it is worth saying that the combination of the three factors that exist in 
figure 5: reasons of resistance, tactics of resistance, and modes of resistance affects 
resistance and its success or failure. The right combination of the three factors is most 
likely to bring successful resistance. However, this combination actually depends on a 
wider circle as clear in Figure 5. This circle represents the awareness of the people, their 
culture, their acquisition of recourses, their access to power and resources, their ability to 
monitor their collective action, the resisting group size and assets (two among different 
factors mentioned and defined by Mancur Olson), etc... If there is any possibility of 
continuing this research in the future, my primary concern will be to stress on this circle 
that actually shapes and profiles the three factors of the analysis.  
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Figure 5. The analysis of resistance 
Annex 1: 
An interview with a personnel who worked in the Privatization Program until 
1998: 
The interviewee, who worked in designing the privatization programs according 
to each company’s financial and structural status under the Ministry of Public 
Enterprise, was asked to speak about sources of resistance and the implications of such 
resistance on decision making.  
He stated:  
Sources of resistance to privatization are not limited to the workers or employees 
resistance. It is true that they constitute major resistance to privatization; however, they 
still represent one dimension of the resistance. Decision-makers in Egypt represent the 
other dimension of resistance.  
Egypt is one of the countries where policy makers are not satisfied with 
privatization. The reason behind this is that they do not conceive privatizing State 
Owned Enterprises the solution to the problems that Egyptian economy faces and, at the 
same time, they are not welling to give up some of the state strategic or security-
touching fields to the private sector. In addition, some of them are actually aware of the 
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social problems and the effects of privatization on workers and they are some how keen 
on keeping the workers and employees’ jobs.    
Decision makers resisting privatization can actually change the path of 
privatization and its speed. They can delay the decisions of privatizing companies when 
they find it against workers and employees. They can actually constitute a real threat on 
the discourse of privatization. Their resistance is dangerous and very direct. 
 
Before joining the ministry, Moukhtar Khattab was very much known as a 
decision maker that does not accept to have privatization as the solution to all problems. 
He was also known for his sympathy with workers and employees issues. Khattab was 
actually chosen as the Minister of Public Business Sector (in the previous ministry) in an 
attempt to accommodate resistance to privatization and deal with an issue of high 
sensitivity like the workers and the employees’ issue.  
He and his staff were all very reasonable in dealing with those sensitive issues; 
however, at the same time, they had to work hard on the privatization program to prove 
their eligibility to their positions and their efficiency as well. Choosing Khattab as a 
minister for Minister of Public Business Sector was actually an investment to his 
sensitivity to employees’ issues and his commitment to success. This was a solution that 
was found accommodative to workers and even policy-maker’s resistance because you 
are actually putting one of the decision makers who resist privatization and like to keep 
the employees’ jobs in power. 
However, in my point of view, it is necessary to sell some companies even if this 
will lead to the dismissal of some workers while privatizing their company because even 
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if the company is winning now it will not continue winning in the future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2: 
An interview with a personnel in the technical office of the investment ministry: 
In this interview, the personnel, whose job is detecting the financial status of the 
company and specifying the suitable form of privatization, was asked to speak about his 
experience with resistance that aroused when the decision of privatization was taken. 
He stated:  
There have been different forms of resistance that clearly expressed the workers 
dissatisfaction. For example, when the decision was taken to privatize the Delta for 
Fertilizers Company, the workers refused to accept the decision. Therefore, they gathered 
and demonstrated. The decision of privatization was a sign of exploitation and exclusion 
to the workers because the company was actually winning and they had percentages of the 
profits at the end of each year in addition to their salaries and promotions. Privatizing 
meant for them giving up their shares of profits because there are no guarantees the 
investor will keep the company wining and even if he did, he will certainly prefer to buy 
more capital and keep the profit for himself rather than sharing t with the employees. The 
workers’ demonstrations succeeded in scaring the investor who felt the whole 
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environment is unsecured and threatens of trouble. Thus, he refused of going on in the 
deal. 
Another company whose decision of privatization was met with resistance is the 
Egyptian Springs Company. At this company, the workers were afraid of joining the 
private sector. They felt threatened in their wages and careers. Thus, they gathered 
themselves and offered an alternative with the help of the Labor Union. This alternative 
was to sell the company to the workers and the employees as an Employee Share Holder 
Association.  
Another similar example is the Alex Cooling Company. This company owns 15 
big size refrigerators that were very old and not efficiently working. The investor was 
actually going to buy other refrigerators with more capabilities that will mostly use less 
workers.  Feeling threatened in their living, the workers showed resistance and offered the 
same past alternative of buying the company. The alternative or the offer itself is a 
resistance to the official orders of privatizing the company through an anchor investor. 
However, although the Employee Share Holder Association succeeded in the first case 
and the employees managed in their terms to “save” the company, they failed to provide 
the needed amount of money in the case of Alex Cooling. Thus, the company was sold 
afterwards as assets. 
The last case is for the Upper Egypt (Sohag) Spinning and Weaving. At this case, 
the workers were able to reach their voice to the minister of investment. The minister 
personally visited them and was very touched by their demands in a way that he himself 
cancelled the decision of privatizing the company.  
I personally find from my experience that investors definitely prefer quit 
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Annex 3: 
environments where there is no disruptions or resistance. Therefore, in the instances 
where they find demonstrations, strikes, media troubles, or any other form of resistance, 
the best and most easy solution for them is to refuse to go on the deal or claim that they 
are facing financial problems and will not be able to continue with buying. 
An interview with the Privatization assessment expert in the Ministry of Investment: 
The interviewee, who holds a high post in the investment ministry, is authorized to 
deal with the resistant groups and unsatisfied workers. He is also responsible of assessing and 
evaluating the ongoing company’s privatization plans. He was asked to speak about his 
experience with such groups.  
He stated: 
There are many forms of resistance in Egypt. I shall draw examples on such resistance 
in order to understand it better. In Helwan Cement for example, the investor dismissed many 
workers; thus, the workers, the labor union and labor syndicates started to resist this investor. 
They started to suit him and arouse public opinion against him. This investor is an example to 
rigid inventors who do not know how to deal with social forces and formal channels.  
Another example to resistance is the Workers resistance to the privatization attempt in 
Qaha’s company for food. At this company, the Workers and the Labor union headed by Ms. 
Gamalat made demonstrations and strikes against the investor. They create an unstable 
environment for the investor. Thus, the investor refused to pay the rest of the payment and the 
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company returned to the public enterprise sector. 
It is worth noting that the resistance of many workers led to the change of the type of 
privatization that was supposed to be applied to their company. They shifted it to Employee 
Share Holders instead of selling the company to private investors.  
Although this shift is a success for the resistance of the workers, I see that it can lead 
to a total destruction of the company. An Employee Share Holder is successful only when the 
company does not need more money to be pumped into it and, at the same time, there is no 
outside competition with it. In general, Employee Share Holders do not have resources that 
can create money like an investor. In addition, they are incapable of managing an 
administration and making plans and strategies that will allow them to face completion may 
be because they lake experience, they lack courage, they lake the capability of scientific 
analysis. 
Thus, I find that although changing the type of privatization to Employee Share 
Holders is a real achievement to resistance, it is not always a wise decision. For example, in 
Alex Cooling, the employees refused to accept selling their company to a foreign investor and 
they insisted on forming an Employee Share Holder; however, after the decision was taken to 
transform the company to Employee Share Holder, Workers faced many financial problems 
that inhibited them from paying their shares on time. In addition, they could not renew the old 
cooling refrigerators to face market competition. 
The decision to transform a company to an Employee Share Holder should be 
restrained with the company’s status and the present and future market competition. 
At last, one should not think of all privatization efforts as being faced with resistance 
because some companies did not meet any workers resistance, like Bisco Misr Company and 
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Annex 4: 
An interview with a founding member and an activist in the anti-globalization 
movement in Egypt. 
At this interview, the interviewee was asked to speak about the perspective of 
the anti-globalization movement in Egypt regarding resistance. 
The interviewee stated: 
The anti-globalization movement in Egypt is a movement directed towards 
globalization in general. Thus, our fields of activities are different. We actually resist 
the attempts to westernize or to be accurate the attempts to Americanize our identity. 
Globalization as we observe it and identify it is Americanization and Westernization; it 
is more of MacDonaldization. 
Hence, we resist the war on Iraq as a manifestation of the American Power. We 
also resist opening borders, liberalizing, deregulating, and other components of the 
IMF and the World Bank adjustment packages. They are other manifestations of the 
Western intervention and means to accelerate globalization. 
Privatization is one of the themes that we resist (although not the only one). It is 
Elahram for Drinks Company. The two companies welcomed the private investor because 
they found themselves going to enjoy all the privileges of the private sector (salaries, 
promotions...) 
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very much connected to liberalization and is one of the themes of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which are two of the three major international 
institutions pushing globalization.  
However, our approach of resistance to privatization and liberalization is not a 
local. We are actually not convinced that local resistance can bring out outcomes in the 
short run. We are actually much convinced that global and international resistance is 
the most effective way to resist globalization and liberalization. In that way, we fight 
globalization using globalization. Hence, we hold international conferences and attend 
NGOs’ conferences representing Egypt instead of working locally in one case or few 
cases. Working globally spreads our point of view and gathers international support on 
such point, which sounds much effective and threatening to big powers and major 
international institutions (WTO, IMF, and the World Bank). We actually believe that if 
want to penetrate major decision makers in the world, we should do this directly and in 
a pressuring manner. Global resistance achieves this and offers a good possibility to 
reach international decision makers. 
On the other hand, the anti-globalization movement in Egypt has limited time, 
resources and finance. So, what can we choose: to spend our resources and waste our 
time in local resistance that will not bring out tangible outcomes on the macro level or 
mobilize our resources in strategy that can bring out national outcomes (or outcomes on 
the macro level)? 
 The answer was simple and we have chosen to resist globally and negotiate 
directly with financial institutions and international decision makers. 
However, this does not mean that we did not work locally at all. We actually 
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helped some workers in few cases against the investor. Nevertheless, it was never our 
approach in dealing with globalization, liberalization, or privatization. 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 5: 
An interview with three personals in the Privatization unit in the investment 
ministry: 
The interviewees whose jobs directly involve them with workers as they 
investigate the numbers, the jobs, and the responsibilities of the workers and mind their 
status after privatization 
They said: 
The status of the Egyptian workers is extremely behind their counterparts in 
developing countries. They do not have the same salaries, promotions, or privileges. The 
Egyptian worker is treated very unjustly. However, the culture of the Egyptian Workers 
and their lack of awareness contribute to the continuation of such status. The Egyptian 
workers resist change in general. They are like normal Egyptians who prefer what they 
know on what they do not know or as they say “Elly ne3rafoh ahsan men elly 
mane3rafoosh”. They do not guarantee that this change will benefit them. They do not 
like to risk. If ever there are losers in the game, every worker is thinking himself that 
loser that will be dismissed or his salary will be cut to the half.  
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They like the public or governmental job. It provides them with a constant salary 
and most probably without needing him to work at all. From our experience, we see 
companies that are loaded with ten times the number of employees needed to operate it. 
Kafr Eldawar Spinning and Weaving, for example, is loaded with more than 250,000 
employees. They come on the morning and sit without jobs. There are no machines that 
can ever cover their numbers. In Alexandria Public Printers also, workers were used to 
go and sit without work at all. It is not only about the fact that they do not work but it is 
also about the fact that they do not care about the quality of their work, the amount of 
products, or the sale. So, in the Spinning and Weavings, it is very common to see 
workers working on a machine that produce cloth with high defaults without them or 
their supervisor reporting it. In Omar Effendi and Hanon, for example, the employees are 
not welling to stand up from their places and show you the goods they just point out with 
their fingers. Moreover, they can tell you from where to buy it from outside with a better 
price. They do not care about the production decreasing or increasing, sold or unsold 
because their salaries go on any way. They enjoy the salary. They enjoy the social 
securities. In addition, they go out from their jobs after two hours of starting it to work in 
other places. What can they find better?! 
Thus, we find that it is not about resisting privatization itself. Workers are not 
aware of the meaning of privatization. They are just resisting change and they are 
defending their interests. 
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Annex 6: 
An interview with the Privatization assessment expert in the Ministry of 
Investment: 
The interviewee, who is authorized to deal with the resistant groups and 
unsatisfied workers, was asked to speak about the experience of the privatization unit 
regarding the Delta for fertilisers. 
He stated: 
The Delta for fertilisers is one of the companies that witnessed high resistance 
to their privatization decision. For me there is a very important triangle that when all its 
corners are reached, any decision to privatize can be cancelled or changed. The three 
corners of the triangle exist in the case of the Delta for fertilisers. 
The three corners, which are media, parliament, and workers activism, were all 
intelligently deployed in the case of the Delta for fertilisers. The Delta workers were 
very active spreading their case everywhere. They aroused their case in the 
newspapers, whether opposition newspapers or national ones. In addition, they reached 
their members of parliament who aroused their case in the parliament. They even went 
 120 
 
to the parliament and distributed a petition on all the members of the parliament. 
Furthermore, they took advantage of the minister’s visit to their company to 
gain his sympathy and support. They gathered around him and told him a very 
sympathetic story about how they built this company, and how the company is 
successful and not losing at all and they are willing to buy it. The ministry had nothing 
to do but to agree to their demands. 
 
The resistance of the Delta workers was very organized. They turned their case 
into a national security case that threatens of instability and public unrest. Thus, 
decision makers had to accommodate to the situation in order not to jeopardize national 
security. 
In response to the resistance of the Delta workers, the ministry refused the 
investors’ offers to buy the company although one e of these offers was very close to 
the ministry’s demands and the real price of the company. In addition, the director of 
the Delta public enterprise himself backed off the efforts to privatize the company. He 
had to because the workers accused him of selling a successful company that earns 
profits for his personal interest. Thus, he submitted a memo at which he asks to cancel 
the privatization decision because it started to be an issue that touches his dignity and 
honor. 
However, I have to say at the end that the decision to postpone the company’s 
privatization plan may not be the right decision. It is true that the company is earning 
profits now but its marginal profit is decreasing. This means that the company is not 
sustaining its competitiveness and thus will not continue earning profits in the future. 
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Annex 7: 
An interview with the Privatization assessment expert in the Ministry of 
Investment: 
The interviewee, who is authorized to deal with the resistant groups and 
unsatisfied workers, was asked to speak about the experience of the privatization unit 
regarding the Assiut cement company. 
He stated: 
The decision to privatize Assiut Cement company was met some resistance at 
the beginning. However, the investor knew how to deal with this resistance and the 
resistance was accommodated.  
The investor increased and even tripled the early retirement pensions. He 
introduced new privileges and social securities. In addition, he provided the employees 
with new and packages of training programs. All such steps accommodated resistance 
and reversed it. 
The investor in the case of Cemex is the ideal investor we always hope to have 
and deal with. He paid the amounts of payments regularly. He dealt with the workers in 
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an intelligent way. He knew how to pursue profit and work efficiently without losing 
the humane sense in dealing with workers and their problems.    
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 8: 
Face to face questionnaire with the employees of the Delta for Fertilisers Company: 
1) Nahed Mohamed Abuelnasr, who holds a Bachelor degree in Science and Chemistry and 
works as the head of the Environment department: 
Privatization is the transfer of the public enterprises that do not make profits. The 
investor is supposed to renew the company and improve its technical and financial standard. 
However, it leads to more unemployment because the investor dismisses many workers. In 
addition, there are no guarantees the workers will take all their earnings when they go out. 
On the other hand, the salaries of the remaining workers may go up because the number of 
the workers decreased and the production increased (supposedly). I was very sad when I 
knew my company is going to be privatized because our company is successful and 
profitable company. I was very worried that our privileges and promotions would be 
canceled, our salaries would be reduced, and we ourselves could be dismissed. I was 
thinking to leave the company if the privatization decision was executed. 
2) Mohamed Abdel-hakim, who holds a Bachelor degree in commerce and works as a senior 
supervisor in the computers department: 
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Privatization to me is selling public enterprises to the private sector. I do not like 
privatization because it leads to early retirement and dismissal of workers. Dismissal and 
early retirement are the same because although you hold an amount of money in your hands, 
you spend it on unneeded things or to have your daughters marries or you your self married, 
which puts you in a bad position at the end. 
There is also a difference between working with the government and working with an 
investor. I do not feel safe when I work with an investor. My future is not secured and I can 
be dismissed at any minute. In addition, my health and social securities will be extremely 
minimized. Thus, I totally refused and opposed the decision to have my company privatized 
and I expressed my refusal to the labor syndicate and our representative in it. 
3) Mohamed Abulkheir, who holds an industrial secondary certificate and works as an 
electric technician: 
Privatization to me is transferring the ownership of a public enterprise to some 
individuals. I actually hate privatization because it can lead to dismissing many workers 
unjustly. There are also no guarantees with a private investor that our promotions will 
continue and our financial rights will be paid regularly. We know the public sector’s 
principles, work requirements, and obligations while the private sector is very new to us. As 
the verse says, what we know is certainly better than what we do not know. Thus, I was very 
angry when I knew my company will be privatized and I went to our representatives in the 
labor syndicate.  Those representatives lived with us this situation second by second. They 
knew our demands upon which they behaved. 
4) Salah Abdel-Hamid, who only reads and writes and works as a technician: 
As I knew and heard, privatization is the “sale of company”. I think that such selling 
 124 
 
should be in the early days of the company and not in a company that used to a certain 
system for a long time. Workers came to this company knowing that it works in a certain 
way (like any other public sector enterprise); thus, it is not the right of any one to change 
something that we have been used to for a longtime. We went to our representatives in the 
labor syndicate. We knew they would be able of dealing with the decision and those who 
took it.  
 
5) Soliman Mohamed Soliman, who holds a Bachelor degree in Medicine and works as the 
head of the medical department: 
Privatization to me is the sale of public enterprises, whether strategic enterprises or 
not, important enterprises or not, successful enterprises or not. Selling public enterprises 
threatens the stability of prices, the security of the country, and the continuation of services 
provision to poor people, which is wrong. If our company was privatized, unemployment 
would have gone up, incomes or salaries would have been reduced, and prices would have 
been raised. Raising pricing in a company like ours is very dangerous because our products 
are very important products that go to the poor people. Raising prices means that farmers 
will not be able to buy fertilisers to their lands. It also means that some investors will control 
the only public producer of urea, which is used in many products. I was very angry when I 
knew that our company will be privatized because it is not only a “change”, it is a “change to 
the worse”. 
6) Abdel-Aziz Khalaf, who holds a Bachelor degree in Engineering and works as a general 
manager in cars and buses’ operation and maintenance: 
Privatization to me is to increase deregulation and liberalization. It is supposed to 
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lead to the emergence of a new philosophy that gets red of routine, encourages new blood 
and new energies, and deploys new technologies. Thus, it ought to increase productivity, 
raise the quality of the products, employ more workers, and raise the living standards of such 
workers. However, our case is different. The assessment of the company’s prices was wrong. 
It extremely undermined the value if the company. It counted for 25% of the real value of the 
company. The price of the land or the city that exists within the land is more than the price 
that was offered to the company. In addition, the private investor that wanted to buy our 
company was the only producer to urea beside our company, which would have led to the 
monopoly of the urea by one investor. What makes the problem worse is that privatizing our 
company would have led to the dismissal of 200 workers (unneeded employment) and the 
increase of unemployment rather than the increase of employment because there are no new 
fertilisers companies built in order to absorb the dismissed workers. We decided to discuss 
with labor syndicate the possible means to deal with the privatization decision. We decided 
not to resort to demonstrations and strikes because of the state‘s restricted laws that put 
conditions on any assembly.       
7) Elsaied Khaled, who holds the preparatory certificate and works as a bus driver: 
  To me, privatization means selling public enterprises. It leads to unreasonable 
dismissal of employees, reduction of wages, loss of social securities and working more 
hours. I hate privatization. I have heard from many people that worked in companies that 
were privatized later, like Coca-Cola and Misr for Construction Company, that they were 
severely harmed. Many workers were dismissed, the employees’ salaries were not paid for 
more than three months, and promotions were highly reduced. Thus, we did not wait until 
our company is privatized. We went to our representatives in the labor syndicate and asked 
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for their help. 
8) Khaled Ata, who holds an industrial secondary certificate and works as a bus driver: 
Privatization to me is selling public enterprises to individuals. It can bring some 
improvements concerning wages and employment. 
9) Saleh Abdelhay, who holds the preparatory certificate and works as a bus driver: 
Privatization is the sale of public enterprises. It is very bad and extremely harmful. I 
say this out of what I hear about the companies that experienced privatization. We heard of 
what the investors did in many companies. They reduced wages, limited the promotions to a 
minority and limited the influence of the labor union and labor syndicates. In Misr for 
artificial gases in Musterd and the 10
th
 of Ramadan Cables Company, they dismissed many 
workers. On the other hand, the investors in Alexandria Detro-chemicals Company and Misr 
Chemicals Company extremely reduced the workers’ privileges, promotions, and health 
securities. After hearing of such bad privatization experiences, we were highly intimidated. 
Hence, we went to our representatives in the labor syndicate whom we primarily elected to 
represent us and represent our wishes and demands. 
10) Shehata Elsaied Shawada, who holds a Bachelor degree in Commerce and works as the 
head of the Training department: 
Privatization is the selling of public enterprises to the private sector. It holds the 
possibility of raising wages and promotions. It also holds the possibility of workers’ 
dismissal or wages’ reduction. It represents “Change”. However, nobody knows whether it is 
change for something good or bad. Past experiences in privatization irritated us and 
suggested that this change will be for worse. Thus, we asked our representatives in the labor 
syndicate to make anything to cancel the decision to privatize our company. 
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Annex 9: 
Two interviews with the Delta for Fertilisers representatives in the labor syndicate: 
1) Mr. Nabeeh Shafik Shabana, the member in the general syndicate for chemicals 
and the member in the top management of the syndicate commission in the Delta for 
Fertilisers: 
At the beginning, I would like to say that we all know this privatization is imposed 
on us from abroad, it is not the sincere wish of the people or even the government, it is a 
compliance to the global trends and external pressures. 
The Delta for Fertilisers is the only producer of urea after Abu-Keer Company. 
However, Abu-keer company is a private company while the Delta is a public one. As urea 
is used in many important products, it is dangerous to leave it totally to private firms and 
unknown investors. 
In addition, there are no laws in the country that prohibit monopoly or organize it. 
Thus, the prices, quantity, and quality of the products will be out of control. This will 
severely harms and threatens the consumers who are usually the poor farmers and peasants 
who will possibly will not fine the cheap high quality products that the public enterprise 
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deliver. 
On the other hand, having our company privatized arouses many internal problems 
inside the company. The sense of belonging and loyalty increases when we serve a 
company we feel we own and our country owns. We give it all what we can because it is 
part of us and part of our country. We also feel safe and secured when we work in a public 
company because the system is known and no body can dismiss us unjustly. There is no 
motive that makes the government dismisses a number of workers without reason while the 
investor needs to dismiss workers as much as he can to reduce the costs and payments. The 
investor cares more for his interest and the profits he gains. The investor can go around the 
laws. According to law, if the employee is employed in three positions in the same 
workplace and his level was still feeble, the investor can dismiss him. The investor can go 
around the law and put the employee in three areas that he is not qualified in and proves 
that he is disqualified, and then dismisses him. According to the old law, if the employee 
complains he can bring his case in front of a three-members committee. According to the 
new law (Law no.12 for the Year 2003), he can bring it in front of a five-members 
committee. However, the two laws can not bring the employee back to his job. Even the 
court can not bring the employee back to his job. With some luck, it will ask for 
compensations equivalent to number of years. However, the compensations are calculated 
according to the nominal employee’s salary and not the real one that includes promotions 
and privileges. Thus, dismissal is unjust to workers. I do not name it dismissal; I name it 
Butchery. 
2) Mr. Reyad Tolba, the head of the syndicate commission in the Delta for fertilisers:  
Our opinion of privatization was shaped by the past privatization experiences. We 
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have heard of many privatized companies dismissing many workers, reducing wages, and 
reducing privileges. Out of the 196 companies that were privatized I recall five or six 
companies that actually succeeded. The rest of the companies suffered of the early 
retirement policies, the drop in the social securities, and the reduction of promotions. 
In addition to the un-encouraging previous experiences in privatization, our 
experience revealed other things. It revealed that the company would be sold with a price 
based on a bad assessment. The assessment was very old and made 5 years before the date 
of the selling. In addition, the assessment was made in a time where the dollar exchange 
rate in Egyptian pounds was different and far below its value at the time of the sale. Five 
years ago, the dollar was equivalent to 330 piaster. At the time of the sale, the dollar’s 
value increased to 465 piaster. Hence, the company was going to be sold with quarter its 
real value. Thus, we decided to address the media and the Dakahlia members of 
parliament. We sent to many newspapers and writers. In addition, we provided a petition to 
the people’s parliament. We were acting as a very active pressure group pressuring for the 
existence and presence of the company. 
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Annex 10: 
Face to face questionnaire in Cemex (Assiut Cement): 
1) Mr. Badra Mustafa, the head of the human resources department: 
When we knew our company is going to be privatized, we were very worried and 
anxious. We were going into a totally new environment and we were afraid that our 
salaries may go down. After our company was privatized, many things changed. However, 
it was change for better. Unexpectedly, our salaries were doubled and our promotions 
increased. The nature of the work changed. What we were used to manually and by hand, 
we started to do it through computer and database. Surprisingly, our social securities, 
which we though will be mostly affected by privatization, increased and our health 
securities that used to cover only half of the family started to cover the whole family. 
Moreover, we were given a lot of training inside Assiut, in Cairo, and outside Egypt 
(Philippine, and Spain). There has been an increasing concern with the artificial security 
and workers’ safety. For instance, when one of our workers was injured in the workplace, 
the foreign team came to Assiut and gave us a long lecture that we are much important 
than the work and we should not endanger our selves. They wrote reports, investigated the 
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accident, and took preventive procedures to guarantee this will not happen in future. 
There has not been any significant resistance to the privatization decision. On the 
first hand, it is a presidential decision and a decree, which makes it difficult to resist. On 
the other hand, we saw the early retirement file that the foreign investor approved and the 
documents that he signed. This was more than a good start to us because the investor 
approved high sums of money that no domestic investor or public enterprise has ever 
approved. The early retirement sums of money ranged between 90,000 pound and 
150,000pound for workers and in cases of high ranks and senior managers, it reached 
250,000 pound. No employee has ever held such sums of money. The employees were 
more than satisfied. Workers and employees found themselves not only able to work 
separately and own their own jobs, but rather, able to own their own ‘companies’. Two of 
our employees actually took their early retirement payments and bough the buses of the 
Asiut Cement Company. They their own business: their own COMPANY. 
 Thus, only few interruptions happened when the worker knew of the privatization 
decision. For instance, 200 workers made a demonstration demanding the investor not to 
dismiss a certain employee. It was their fear of the wave of dismissals that pushed them to 
make this demonstration. It was a weak demonstration and lasted for two hours only. 
2) Huwaida Abdelgaber Mohamed, an accountant in the financial department: 
Privatization is the sale of public enterprises in order to become a private property 
to an individual or some individuals. We were angry because we felt that a part of us and a 
part of our country is being sold. It really differs when you work for your country and 
when you work for a foreign investor. Transferring the ownership of our company to a 
single investor meant that some one will control us, which made us feel some how 
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unsecured and unsafe. He could dismiss us or manipulate our wages or working hours. At 
last, all the profit would go to him and our country would not benefit from it.  
We were also afraid of the early retirement policies and we were afraid that our 
salaries and promotions might be decreased or we get dismissed. However, I was not 
worried because I am an efficient employee and my record is excellent. On the other hand, 
we were angry because we felt that a part of us and a part of our country is being sold. The 
feeling really differs when you work for your country and when you work for a foreigner  
The previous reasons in addition to the fact that our company was a successful 
company and should not be sold made us complain. We were astonished to know that our 
company is going to be sold although it was very successful and thus should not be put to 
sale. However, we did not return to our representatives in the labor syndicate and we 
decided to wait and see the new investor’s policies and strategies. 
 The situation totally changed after the company was privatized. We were treated 
very well. Our salaries increased. The use of technology and computers increased. We got 
red of routine and the old system of patronage and family connections. Everything started 
to be much organized and classified. In addition, our salaries and system of promotions 
improved. 
3) Abdelnaser Makram, the head of the social securities department and the head of the  
syndicate commission in Cemex: 
When we heard about the decision to privatize our country we were very afraid and 
anxious because we heard that many workers might be dismissed and our salaries might be 
reduced as well. However, I was not worried because I am an efficient employee and my 
record is excellent We also heard we might work more hours and might take fewer 
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promotions. However, we knew it is a presidential decree, which meant it was impossible 
to change it. We decided to wait and see what is the new investor is going to do.  
In fact, everything changed to the better. The productivity increased. The 
administration started to be much organized and decisive. The use of time saving 
technology increased. Our efforts were met with more appreciation and promotion. The 
salary increased and the privileges increased as well.  
 
4) Mohamed Ali Mohamed, an electric technician: 
Privatization is the transfer of a public enterprise to an individual or some 
individuals. We were afraid and anxious when we knew our company is going to be 
privatized. We were afraid of being dismissed or released according to the early retirement 
policy. We were also afraid that our salaries and promotions might be reduced. We decided 
to wait and see especially that it was a presidential decision and a decree, which makes it 
impossible to resist I know I am an efficient employee and my record is excellent and thus 
will not be dismissed. 
We were right to wait. Everything changed. Instead of working from 12-14 hours, I 
started to work only 8 hours after the company was privatized. The production lines were 
renewed and the production increased. We got red of the routine. We also became no more 
over-staffed. Thus, our salaries and promotions increased.  
5) Ahmed Abdullah Ahmed, machines’ maintenance technician:  
When we knew the decision to privatize the company, we were afraid of instability 
and the possible harm it may bring to us. Thus, we were anxious and afraid. We knew we 
could be dismissed and our salaries can be reduced. However, we preferred to wait and see 
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what the new investor is going to do about all this. I was not worried because I am an 
efficient employee and my record is excellent 
Everything changed after the company was privatized. The company became very 
organized. Instead of working in too many places, the work became very organized and I 
started to work in specific areas and places. Instead of working 10-12 hours, I started to 
work 8 hours only. In addition, our wages and promotions increased.  
 
6) Galal Abdelsamiea,  the head of the accounting department: 
Privatization is the sale of the public enterprises whether through the stock market 
or to an anchor investor. We were afraid of change when we knew our company is going to 
be privatized. We were afraid of having our salaries and promotions reduced or being 
dismissed ourselves but I was not worried because I am an efficient employee and my 
record is excellent 
We decided to wait and see. We were not going to stay quite if we felt we are being 
abused. However, the early retirement file that the investor approved before the company 
was privatized relieved us to a great extent as he approved to pay from 90,000 to 250,000 
to the worker. After privatization, there has been a revolution in the company. Such 
revolution turned everything to the better. Our salaries doubled and tripled. Our 
promotions increased. Our working hours went from 12-14 working hours to only 8 
working hours. Thus, the work environment became very encouraging. In addition, our 
health securities and social securities increased. Our travel and transfer payments also 
increased and improved. Moreover, the use of technology in creased and many training 
sessions were organized to raise the employees’ level.  
 135 
 
7) Mohamed Abdelfatah, an employee in the sales department:  
Privatization is the sale of public enterprises to individuals. It means that such 
individuals will be in control of our livings. Thus, we can be dismissed at any minute. Our 
salaries, promotions and privileges can be reduced.  
For the past reasons we were angry when we knew our company is going to be 
privatized. We were also afraid of the change. However, we decided to wait and see. The 
work became very organized. Instead of working from 10 to 12 hours, I started to work 
from 8 to 10 hours maximally. In addition, resources increased. We started to have more 
telephones, computers and a Fax. Our department also became no more overstaffed. All 
this saved us a lot of time and the selling and buying orders started to take seconds instead 
of hours. 
8) MS. Mona Boutros, Cemex communications and image director: 
In order to reach the international standards of labor per ton in the cement industry, 
we made the first call for early retirement. However, we did not reach the international 
standards. Thus, we made the second call for early retirement, which included more 
privileged and higher sums of money than the first call. 
9) An employee in Cemex: 
Privatization is the ownership transfer from public sector to private sector. I was 
worried when I knew my company is going to be privatized. Especially when I knew it is a 
foreign company. I was afraid of being dismissed or my salary decrease. We decided to 
wait and see. After privatization, true that many workers went out, but they were very 
satisfied with their early retirement payments. On the other hand, our salaries increased. 
The work became very organized and specified because our numbers decreased. 
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Everything became automated and dependence on technology increased. In my job 
specifically, it became much easier to know any piece of information and in no time 
because the database highly improved. 
10) An employee in Cemex: 
Privatization is the transfer of ownership from the public sector to the private. I was 
not very worried when I knew may company was privatized because I knew of the big 
 
sums of money the investor was offering in his early retirement offer. I actually asked to be 
early retired but they refused because of my good dedicated work. 
After privatization, many things changed. Production increased. The work became 
very organized. Instead of working 16 hours, I work 8 hours now. The number of hours is 
a rule in the company. Mr. Ignacio Madridejos, Managing Director, insisted on certain 
working hours that no worker have to exceed them. 
11) An employee in Cemex: 
Privatization is the sale of the company. All the employees were worried and 
anxious when they knew the company was going to be privatized. We were afraid of being 
dismissed or having their salaries reduced. There has been a strike by a thousand workers 
who were very afraid of going out in the early retirement. However, after they knew of the 
sums of money they were going to take, they were very satisfied. Before privatization, I 
worked more hours (12 h.) and my salary was low. After privatization, I started to work 
exactly 8 hours and my salary increase.  
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Annex 11:  An attachment: 
The document used by the employees and labor syndicate representative in 
the Delta for fertilisers to contact the media and members of Parliament 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 138 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography: 
 
Adam, Christopher, William Cavendish, and Percy Mistry. Adjusting Privatization, Case 
Studies from Developing Countries. London: James Currey Ltd, 1992. 
 
 
Ahmed, Nazli M. Parliamentary Debates over the external Dimensions of Privatization. 
In Privatization in Egypt: The Debate in the People’s Assembly, ed. Badran, W. 
and Wahby, A. Cairo: Center for Political Research and Study, 1996. 
 
 
Algohary, M. Globalization and Islamic culture. Cairo: Dar Al Amin for publishing, 
2002. 
 
 
Al-Sayyid, Mustafaa. K. “Privatization: The Egyptian Debate”. Cairo Papers in Social 
Science. Vol.13 (4), 1991. 
 
 
Amin, Samir. Capitalism in the Age of Globalization. London: Zed Books, 1999. 
 
 
_________. Our Century: A critique. Beirut: Arab diffusion Company, 1999. 
 
 
Background and history of privatization. [database on-line]. From 
www.afscme.org/wrkplace/snet03.htm. Accessed at 11-8-2004.  
 
 139 
 
 
Belev, Boyan. Forcing Freedom: Political Control of Privatization and Economic 
Opening in Egypt. United States: University Press of America, 2000.   
 
 
Binns, David. Privatization through Employee Ownership: Learned from the 
International Experience, 2000. From http://cog.kent.edu/lib/Binns. Accessed at 
20-10-2004. 
 
 
Boubakri, Narjess and Cosset, Jean-Claude. “Does privatization meet the expectations? 
Evidence from African countries”. Plenary on Privatization and Corporate 
Governance. African Economic Research Consortium biannual research 
workshop. Kenya: Nairobi, 1999. 
 
 
Brett, E.A. In Privatization in Less Developing Countries, ed. Cook P. and Kirkpatrick, 
C. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988. 
 
 
Brune, Nancy, Geoffrey Garrett, and Bruce Kogut. The International Monetary Fund and 
the Global Spread of privatization. The Reginald H. Jones Center: Wharton 
School, 2003. 
 
 
Burki, S.J. and Perry, G.P. Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter. World 
Bank Latin American and Caribbean studies. Washington, D.C:  The World 
Bank, 1998.  
 
 
Cemex Egypt at Glance. www.cemex.com.eg/cc/cc_was2.asp. Accessed at 22-10-2004. 
 
 
Cemex. 2001. Accessed at 22-10-2004. From 
www.bigpicturesmallworld.com/Global%20Inc%202/pgs/repcorp/cmx.  
 
 
Chin, Christin and James Mittelman. Conceptualizing Resistance. In Globalization and 
the Politics of Resistance, ed.  Gills, B. Britain: Antony Rowe Ltd, 2000. 
 
 
Cook, P. and Kirkpatrick, C. Privatization in Less Developing Countries. London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988. 
 
 
 140 
 
Davis, Joseph. E. Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements. U.S.A: State 
University of New York Press, 2002. 
 
 
Dearing, J. W. and Rogers, E. M. Agenda setting. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 
1996. 
 
 
Debande, O. and Friebel, G. A Positive Theory of Insider-Privatization, November 1999. 
From http://www.hhs.se/personal/Friebel/welcome/papers/privatisation1.pdf. 
Accessed at 11-8-2004.   
 
 
Delta for Fertilisers and Chemical Productions Company. Brief history of the Delta for 
fertilisers. Egypt: Mansoora. 
 
 
Discussion Paper. International Labour Office. No. 2, Switzerland: Geneva, 1999. 
 
 
Brown, Ed. Tinkering with the System. In Structural Adjustment: Theory, Practice, and 
Impact, ed. Mohan, Giles et al. London and New York: Routledge, 2000. 
 
 
El-Ghonemy, M. Riad. Egypt in the Twenty First Century. London: Routledge Curzon, 
2003. 
 
 
Encyclopedia: natiomaster.com. 2004. “Privatization”. From 
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/privatization. Accessed at 11-8-2004.  
 
 
Feffer, J. Living in Hope: People Challenging Globalization. London: Zed Books, 2002. 
 
 
Gilpin, Robert. The political economy of international relations. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1987. 
 
 
Gills, Barry K. Globalization and the Politics of Resistance. Britain: Antony Rowe Ltd, 
2000. 
 
 
Globalization Terms: Exploitation, Online Source: http://www.aworldconnected.org. 
Accessed at 22-10-2004. 
 
 141 
 
 
Gomaa, S. S. The Civil Debate over Privatization in Egypt. In Privatization in Egypt: The 
Debate in the People’s Assembly, ed. Badraan, W. and Wahby, A. Cairo: Center 
for Political Research and Study, 1996. 
 
 
Hak-kuk Joh. Privatization of Natural Monopolies & Competition Issues. International 
Conference on Competition Policy: Tashkent, June 2003. From 
http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/privatization. 
 
 
Hasouna, Mohamed. Sides of the Egyptian Experience in Reforming the Public 
Enterprise sector. The Privatization department: Ministry of Investment in Egypt, 
2003. 
 
 
Hay, C. and March, D. Demystifying Globalization. Britain: Antony Rowe Ltd, 2000. 
 
 
Hulme, David and Edwards, Michael. NGOs, States and Donors: An Overview and Key 
Issues. UK: Carfax Publishing Company, 1997. 
 
 
“Institutional Aspects of Privatization: A comparative approach in the ESCWA Region”. 
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. New York: United Nations, 
1997. 
 
 
“Investing in Cement”, Al Ahram Weekly (August 8-11), electronic periodical: 
www.sis.gov.eg/public/letter/html/text321.htm. Accessed at 22-10-2004.  
 
 
James et al. Conceptualizing Resistance to Globalization. In Globalization and the 
Politics of Resistance, ed. Gills, B. Britain: Antony Rowe Ltd, 2000. 
 
 
Jacobson, T. and Lough, T. 2000. World Bank and Multinational Corporations. Canada: 
Toronto Globe. 
 
 
Kikeri, Sunita and John Nellis. An Assessment of Privatization. The World Bank 
Research observer. Vol.19 (1), April.2004.  
 
 
Killick, T. and Commander, S. In Privatization in Less Developing Countries, ed. Cook, 
P. and Kirkpatrick, C. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988. 
 142 
 
 
 
Kurland and Brohawn. “Beyond Privatization: An Egyptian Model”. American Banker 
Conferences on ESOPs. U.S: New York, 1993.  
 
 
Lancaster, Carol. Aid to Africa so much to do, so little done. A century Foundation book. 
The University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
 
 
Lobe, James. UK: Report Says World Bank, IMF Policies Provoke Worldwide, April 
2002.  From www.corpwatch.org. Accessed at 20-10-2003. 
 
 
Mandell, B. R. The Privatization of Everything. New Politics. Vol.9 (1), 2002. 
 
 
McMichael, P. Development and Social Change. United States: Pine Forge Press, 2000. 
 
 
Milward, Bob. What is Structural Adjustment?. In Structural Adjustment: Theory, 
Practice, and Impact, ed. Mohan, Giles et al. London and New York: Routledge, 
2000. 
 
 
Ministry of Public Enterprise. Egypt’s national Privatization Program for 2002/2003. 
The Public Enterprise Office: Privatization Unit. 
 
 
Ministry of Public Enterprises. The Challenges facing the Egyptian Public enterprise 
sector reform. The Public Enterprise Office: Privatization Unit, 2003. 
 
 
Mohieledin, Mahmoud and Nasr, Sahar. On Privatization in Egypt: With Reference to the 
Experience of the Czech Republic and Mexico. In Privatization in Egypt: The 
Debate in the People’s Assembly, ed. Badraan, W. and Wahby, A. Cairo: Center 
for Political Research and Study, 1996. 
 
 
Mosaad, Nevine. The Process of Privatization in the Egyptian Party Discourse. In 
Privatization in Egypt: The Debate in the People’s Assembly, ed. Badraan, W. and 
Wahby, A. Cairo: Center for Political Research and Study, 1996. 
 
 
Merzaban, Dalia (January 2004), Business monthly. Electronic periodical: 
http://www.amcham.org.eg/bic. Accessed at 11-10-2004.  
 143 
 
 
 
National Democratic Party. Mubarak’s declaration in his meeting with the NDP. Egypt: 
Cairo, 1988. 
 
 
National Progressive Unionist Party. NPUP program for change. Egypt: Cairo.  
 
 
Peirce, William. Privatization, Nationalization and aspects of transition, 2000. From 
www.uni-erfurt.de/finanzwissenschaft/lv/Handbook%20files/14peirce.doc. 
Accessed at 11-10-2004. 
 
 
“People’s health movement”. International People's Health Council, (January 2003). 
http://action.web.ca/home/clcmed/en_issues. Accessed at 11-10-2004.  
 
 
Phelan, James. “Renowned U.S. Economists Denounce Corporate-Led Globalization”. 
Common Dreams News Center. Vol. 2, No4, November 2001. 
 
President Mubarak discourse to Mayo, Mayo (16-12-1985).  
 
 
President Mubarak speech on Labor Day, Mayo (2-5-1983).   
 
 
Privatization and social issues. 1996. From http://www.fou.uib.no. Accessed at 11-8-
2004. 
 
 
Privatization, Competition, and partnership. Washington, D.C. From 
www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/rpt/pvt/ch2.htm. Accessed at 11-8-2004.  
 
 
Privatization in Egypt. Carana Corporation: Quarterly review. USAID Monitoring 
Services project, (2002, April). 
 
 
Prospects for Economic Growth. From www.infoprod.co.il/country/egypt1d.htm, 2004. 
Accessed at 11-8-2004.  
 
 
Purnell, J. Popular resistance to the privatization of Communal Lands, 1997. From 
http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/lasa95/purnell.html. Accessed at 11-8-2004.  
 
 
 144 
 
Schuurman, Franc J. Beyond the Impasse. U.K: Biddles Lid, Guildford and King’s Lynn, 
1996.  
 
 
Scott, James. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. London: 
Yale University Press, 1985. 
 
 
Smith, Adrian and John Pickles. Theorizing Transition: The Political Economy of Post-
Communist Transformations. London: Routledge Curzon, 1999. 
 
 
Stanford, R. A. Exploitation, 1996. From 
http://facweb.furman.edu/~dstanford/relecon/exploita.htm. Accessed at 11-10-
2004.  
 
 
Starr, Paul. 1988. The meaning of Privatization. In Privatization and the Welfare State, 
ed. Alfred Kahn and Sheila Kamerman. Princeton University Press. 
 
 
Tarrow, Sidney. Power in Movement: Social Power and Continuous Politics. United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
 
_________. Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics. Oxford: Clarndon Press, 
1989. 
 
 
Tarrow, S. and Meyer, D. S.. The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a 
New Century. USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998. 
 
 
“The meaning and the use of the term social exclusion”. Centre for Informatic 
Apprenticeship and Resources, 2004. From http://ciaris.ilo.org/english/frame/r1-
3.htm. Accessed at 11-10-2004.  
 
 
The National Democratic Party. The NDP platform. Egypt: Cairo. 
 
 
The Wafd Party. The New Wafd Party platform. Egypt: Hizb Al wafd Algadeed. 
 
 
The Social and economic implications of the early retirement policy. The labor Union 
and the Researches and Studies Center. Egypt: Cairo, 2000. 
 145 
 
 
 
The Socialist Labor Party platform for change. Egypt: ‘Hizb Alamal Aleshteraky’. 
 
 
Wahby, Azza. The Debate over the Social Problems of Privatization in the People’s 
Assembly. In Privatization in Egypt: The Debate in the People’s Assembly, ed. 
Badraan, W. and Wahby, A. Cairo: Center for Political Research and Study, 1996. 
 
 
Welfens, Paul J. Privatization and Foreign Direct Investment in the East European 
Transformation: Theory, Options and Strategies. In Privatization, Liberalization 
and Destruction, ed. Casaba, L. Great Britain: Athenaeum Press Ltd, Newcastle 
upon Tyne, 1994.   
 
